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Abstract
The thesis comprehends four chapters: the first chapter concerns with the
positive correlation between cross-country price level and per-capita income,
which is generally regarded as a stylized fact renowned as the Penn-Balassa-
Samuelson effect. The chapter provides evidence that the price-income rela-
tionship is actually non-linear and that it turns negative in low income coun-
tries. The result is robust along both cross-section and panel dimensions. The
main contribution of this chapter is to uncover a new empirical regularity such
that the price level firstly decreases and then increases along the development
process.
The second chapter argues that, in order to capture the non-monotonicity
of the price-income relationship, we need a modified Balassa-Samuelson frame-
work that accounts for the fact that low-income and high-income countries have
very different economic structures and are at different stages of development.
Particular emphasis needs to be put on the relevance of the agricultural sec-
tor in poor countries and for . The contribution of this chapter is to show
that a model linking the price level to the process of structural transformation
captures the non-monotonic pattern of the data.
The third chapter departs from the Balassa-Samuleson framework and anal-
yses the price-income relationship in a multisector Eaton-Kortum model of
ix
trade. The chapter shows that also within this framework a negative-price
income relationship emerges. This provides further support to the empirical
result shown in the first chapter and additional insights on the determinants
of such relationship.
The fourth chapter focuses on the relationship between foreign capital flows
and income inequality in emerging countries. Developing countries experience
a prolonged period of real exchange rate overvaluation after they have opened
their capital and current account. This real exchange rate overvaluation is
associated with rising income inequality within a country. The chapter pro-
vides evidence of a significant positive correlation between net capital flows
and the Gini coefficient. The chapter presents also a model connecting the
dynamics of the balance of payments with a search and matching model of the
labor market. This provides a useful analytical framework to disentangle the
mechanisms that can link foreign capital flows to income inequality through
the impact of real exchange rate adjustment on the price of labor and quantity
of employment.
x
Chapter 1
The price of development
1.1 Introduction
It is widely understood that market exchange rates do not give accurate
measures of real income in different economies and that adjustment by pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) factors is necessary for such measures. This un-
derstanding is based on an observed empirical regularity that richer countries
have a higher price level than poorer countries. The positive correlation be-
tween cross-country price level and per-capita income is generally regarded as
a stylized fact. This result was documented for twelve developed countries in
the seminal paper of Bela Balassa (1964), was confirmed for a large sample of
countries as soon as data from the International Comparison Program (ICP)
became available and is now renowned as the Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect
(Penn- BS).1
The paper makes an important qualification to this general understanding.
Using non-parametric estimation, it provides evidence that the price-income
1The Penn-BS effect was documented also by Summers and Heston (1991), Barro (1991),
and Rogoff (1996). Samuelson (1994) stresses that the proper name for it would be Ricardo-
Viner-Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson-Penn-Bhagwati-et alt. effect.
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relationship is non-linear and that it turns negative in low-income countries
both along a cross-section and a panel dimension. Standard regression analysis
in sub-samples of poor, middle-income, and rich countries is consistent with
this finding. The results of the paper are robust to possible sources of bias
from PPP estimation and measurement error in low-income countries.
The Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect is at the basis of our understanding
of long-run real exchange rate movements. The paper makes a significant
contribution on the positive side by uncovering a twist to what has long been
accepted as a well-established empirical regularity. From a policy point of view,
by showing that in poor countries the price-income relationship is negative, the
paper suggests that there is a ”natural” depreciation of the real exchange rate
along the development process. If so, this is an important finding that central
banks and governments of low-income countries should take into account as
they pursue their exchange rate policy.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 shows that the price-income
relationship is non-monotonic using both non-parametric and linear estima-
tions. Section 1.3 establishes that the results are robust to measurement error,
to the structure of the Penn World Tables database I use and that the findings
are not driven by biases in PPP estimation. Section 1.4 concludes, summariz-
ing the main findings and discussing possible explanation for these results.
1.2 The price-income relationship
In this section I show that the price-income relationship is non-monotonic.
I provide evidence along a cross-section, panel, and time-series dimension
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through both linear and non-linear estimation. Following the literature on
the Penn-BS effect, I measure income per capita in purchasing power parity
(PPP) and define the price level as the ratio of the PPP to the exchange rate
with the US dollar.2 Unless alternatively specified, the database of reference
is the Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0 version.
1.2.1 Cross-section dimension
In Figure 1.1 we can see an example of the little attention that the literature
has paid to the Penn-BS effect in developing countries. The figure illustrates
the positive price-income relationship provided in Rogoff’s (1996) excellent
review of the purchasing power parity puzzle. Since observations with an
income per capita lower than Syria are gathered in a cloud of points, it is
difficult to properly disentangle the relationship between price and income in
poor countries.
Therefore, in Figure 1.2, using the same data-set as in Rogoff (1996), I plot
the log-values of income per capita.3 I investigate the price-income relation-
ship using a non-parametric estimation technique known as LOWESS (locally
weighted scatter smooth), which allows me to impose as little structure as
possible on the functional form. This estimation suggests that the Penn-BS
effect does not hold in the poorest 25% of countries in the sample, where the
relationship is actually downward sloping. The minimum point of the curve
corresponds to an income level of around 1350 PPP $ (1985 prices), which is
equivalent to the income of Senegal in the year 1990.
2I use income per capita at constant prices for the panel and time-series analysis and
income at current prices for the cross-section analysis.
3This is Penn World Table 5.6 (reference year 1985); he considers the year 1990
3
In commenting the result of figure 1.1, Rogoff (1996) stressed that ”The
relationship between income and prices is quite striking over the full data set
(...); it is far less impressive when one looks either at the rich countries as a
group, or at developing countries as group. In this paper we take Rogoff’s point
further using a non-parametric estimation that shows that the relationship
is actually striking when looking at rich countries as a group and negative
when looking at poor countries as a group. According to our knowledge,
the non-monotonicity of the price-income relationship has not been previously
documented in the literature.
The LOWESS estimation works as follows: Consider an independent vari-
able xn and a dependent variable yn. For each observation yn the LOWESS
estimation technique runs a regression of xn using few data points around
xn. The regression is weighted so that the central point (xn; yn) receives the
highest weight and points further away get less weight. The fitted value of
this regression evaluated at yn represents the smoothed value y
S
n which is used
to construct the non-parametric curve that links y and x. The procedure is
repeated for each observation (xn; yn). The number of regressions is equal to
the number of observations, and the smoothed curve is the set of all (xn; y
S
n ).
LOWESS estimation requires that the bandwidth of observations included
in the regression of each point be chosen. Specifying a large bandwidth pro-
vides a smoother estimation, but increases the risk of bias by including obser-
vations from other parts of the density. A small bandwidth can better identify
genuine features of the underlying density, but increases the variance of the
estimation. In this section I use the default STATA bandwidth of 0.8 and
in the robustness section 1.3.3 I show how using different bandwidths affects
the results. It turns out that the current choice is conservative, because a
4
bandwidth of 0.8 provides a lower-bound of the non-monotonic pattern of the
data.
Next, I extend the analysis to the PWT 7.0 using only the benchmark
countries and the benchmark year.4 Arguably, this is the best available sample
of countries for running this exercise. PWT 7.0 relies on the 2005 ICP round,
which provides the most exhaustive dataset for international comparison of
real income and prices; moreover, using only the benchmark countries and
year minimizes the source of measurement error. I can confirm the strong
positive relationship predicted by the Penn-BS effect by running a standard
linear estimation of price on income: the OLS coefficient is 0.20 with a t-
statistic of 9.67 (see figure 1.3).5
Once I allow for non-linearities, the Penn-BS effect breaks down for low
income countries. Figure 1.4 shows the results of running a LOWESS esti-
mation between price and income imposing little restriction on the functional
form. We can see that the expected upward sloping relationship holds only for
middle- and high-income countries. The relationship is downward sloping for
low-income countries; this involves 22% of the countries in the sample. The
turning point is at 1,396 PPP $ per-capita (2005 prices) equivalent to the in-
come of Zambia in the year 2005. The countries on the downward sloping path
are listed in figure 1.5; we can notice that these are mainly African and Asian
(no Latin-American).
Figure 1.6 reports 95% confidence bands of the LOWESS estimation de-
4I exclude countries with less than one million people in the year 2000 and Zimbabwe and
Tajikistan which are clear outliers; including these countries would reinforce the findings.
The list of the countries included can be found in the appendix.
5I run an OLS regression, with robust standard errors, of the log of the price level of
GDP (variable p from PWT) and the log of GDP per capita in PPPs at current prices (y
from PWT).
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rived from the standard errors of the smoothed values. The confidence interval
confirms the non-monotonic pattern of the data. The Pseudo-R2 of the non-
parametric estimation is 0.66, which is higher than the 0.44 R2 of the linear
model. The F -test comparing the non-parametric model to the linear one
rejects the null hypothesis that the non-linear model does not provide a sta-
tistically significant better fit.
Standard cross-country OLS regression supports the finding of the non-
parametric estimation. In Table 1.1, I rank countries by their income level
and divide the full sample into three groups.6 The price-income relationship
is negative, sizable, and significant for the countries in the bottom group of
income. As the GDP per-capita of the reference group increases the relation-
ship changes sign and the Penn-BS effect becomes larger and more significant.
The results of the OLS regressions are consistent with the non-monotonicity
of the price-income relationship stressed by the non-parametric estimation.
1.2.2 Panel and time-series dimensions
In this section, I analyze the price-income relationship in a panel dimen-
sion. The ICP collects data prices only in benchmark years. Then, the PWTs
estimate prices for other years by rescaling according to the inflation rate dif-
ferential with the US. Although the reliability of this method is unclear, PWTs
are regularly used in empirical analyses with panels; moreover, panel regres-
sions of price on income are commonly used to build measures of real exchange
rate over/undervaluation. Thus, it is relevant to assess if the non-monotonicity
of the price-income relationship holds along a panel dimension too. 7
6There are 42 observations per group on average. The first group includes the countries
up to the income level of Mongolia, the second one up to Lebanon, the third ones includes
the remaining countries with a higher level of income
7Feenstra et al. (2011) are working on a new version of the Penn World Tables that
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If I extend the analysis to a panel of countries between 1950-2009, standard
linear estimation of price on income confirms the positive relationship predicted
by the Penn-BS effect: the OLS coefficient is 0.20 with a t-statistic of 27.60
(figure 1.7).8 However, non-parametric estimation shows that the price-income
relationship is non-monotonic along a panel dimension too. The Penn-BS effect
holds for middle- and high-income countries, but in low-income countries the
relationship is negative (figure 1.8).
Figure 1.9 reports the fitted value of the LOWESS estimation. The turning
point is at 1600 PPP $ per-capita (2005 prices), which corresponds to the
income of Nigeria in the year 2005. The downward sloping arm of the curve
includes 30% of the total observations, and 40% of the countries in the sample.
The countries on the downward sloping arm and their frequencies are reported
in Figure 1.10. We can see that some of the countries are persistently on the
downward-sloping arm (i.e. Nigeria and Tanzania); others moved along the
curve (i.e. China and Vietnam).
Standard panel-data analysis (Table 1.2) confirms the result of the non-
parametric estimation. I show that for developing countries the relationship
between price and income is negative and significant with and without country
fixed-effects.9 I do this by running a regression for the full sample, and then
will make use of historical ICP benchmarks to extrapolate the time series of prices and
real incomes. This new data set will certainly provide better evidence of the price-income
relationship in a panel dimension.
8This is for a sample of 150 countries from 1950 to 2009 using PWT 7.0. Countries with
less than one million people in the year 2000 and clear outliers are excluded; including these
outliers would reinforce the findings. I run an OLS regression of the log of the price level
of GDP (variable p from PWT) and the log of GDP per capita in PPPs at constant prices
(RGDPCH from PWT).
9The relative stability of the coefficients and of the standard errors suggests that in
developing countries the price-income relationship within-country is very similar to the one
between-countries
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for developing countries only.10 This result comes despite a strict definition of
developing countries and a linear restriction on the price-income relationship.
Time-series analysis on selected countries supports the finding that the
development process of low-income countries presents a negative relationship
between price and income; in developed countries this relationship is positive
(Figure 1.11). This is consistent with larger and more significant coefficients
in the panel regression of developing countries when I use country fixed-effects.
This is a striking result that, to my knowledge, has not been previously shown
and merits further research. It suggests that the development process of a
country is characterized by a pattern of real exchange rate depreciation; this is
consistent with the positive correlation between an undervalued real exchange
rate and growth in developing countries documented by the literature as in
Rodrik (2008).
1.3 Robustness checks
In this section I analyze the robustness of the results to possible sources of
measurement error. The data involved in the previous estimations are GDP
per-capita, exchange rates, and PPPs. Data on GDP are very aggregate and
are worldwide computed through the standardized SNA method, they should
not be a mayor concern for measurement error.11 Official exchange rates can
be very different from black market exchange rates in developing countries;
though this applies mainly until the ’80s (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), we need
10I define developing countries as those with a GNI per-capita less than 11,115 US$ (2007),
which is the World Bank’s threshold for high income countries. Notice that in the full sample
with country fixed effects the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
11Gollin et al. (2012) analyze the definitions and measurement approaches used in the
construction of national accounts data in poor countries. They conclude that these aggregate
data are robust to problems associated with informality or household production and that
there is no reason to believe that they are intrinsically flawed.
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to control for this possible source of bias. PPP is clearly the variable that
can be mostly affected by measurement error and it is the one I draw more
attention on.
In this section I show that the findings of the paper are robust to possible
sources of bias from PPP estimation, to the PWT’s structure and to black mar-
ket exchange rates. Moreover, I also show that the non-parametric estimations
of section 1.2 are more likely to be a lower-bound of the true non-monotonicity
that characterizes the data.
1.3.1 Purchasing power parities
The most important source of measurement error comes from the compu-
tation of Purchasing Power Parities, above all in low-income countries. Biased
estimates could seriously affect the results of the paper because PPPs enter
the numerator of the dependent variable and the denominator of the indepen-
dent variable.12 This generates issues of classical measurement error where a
high variance of measurement error leads to a biased and inconsistent estima-
tion. Moreover, I control also for the bias generated by the average of the
measurement error, not only by its variance.
Bias from the variance of measurement error
Chen et al. (2007) analyze the bias of OLS estimation of price on income
when there is a measurement error in the computation of PPPs. They ar-
gue that the independent variable is correlated with the error term, so that
the standard assumptions for a consistent and unbiased least square estima-
12I remind the reader that p = PPPXRAT and y =
GDP
PPP
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tor break down. They conclude that if the β coefficient of the price-income
relationship is positive, the OLS estimate will be biased downwards and can
become negative if the variance of the measurement error is high. In fact, they
show that:13
plim βˆ =
β − σ2η
σ2
y∗
1 +
σ2η
σ2
y∗
(1.1)
where σ2η is the variance of measurement error and σ
2
y∗ is the variance of the
”true” real income per-capita.
From this expression we can see that as the variance of the measurement
error σ2η increases, the estimated βˆ can become negative. Among the poorest
group of countries (the bottom-third) I find an OLS estimation of -0.135. What
level of measurement error’s variance can drive this result? Assuming that
measurement error is correlated to the level of income but not to the level of
price, we can rewrite expression 1.1 as: 14
plim βˆ =
β − σ2η
σ2
y∗
1 +
σ2η
σ2
y∗
=
β − σ2η
σ2Y +σ
2
p+σ
2
η+σY p+σY η
1 +
σ2η
σ2Y +σ
2
p+σ
2
η+σY p+σY η
(1.2)
In the sub-sample of countries where the price-income relationship is neg-
ative, we have σ2Y = 0.302, σ
2
p = 0.067, σY p = 0.27(remember that all the
variables are expressed in logs). I assume that σY η = σY p = 0.27, so that
the covariance between the income level and the measurement error of price is
equal to the covariance between income and price.
13They start specifying the price-income relationship such that p∗i = α+ βy
∗
i + i, where
p∗i is the true price level without measurement error and y
∗
i = Yi − p∗i is the ”true” real
income per-capita. Consider the case where the measured price level pi contains an error
such that pi = p
∗
i + ηi, where ηi has mean zero and is normally distributed; then expression
1.1 follows.
14From Chen et al. specification we have that y∗i = Yi − pi − ηi, from which expression
1.2 follows.
10
The variance of measurement error that would lead to the negative estima-
tion of -0.135 depends on the value of βtrue. Let’s suppose that βtrue is equal
to the OLS estimation over the full sample (0.20). In this case, in order to get
βˆ = −0.135, I would need σ2η = 0.57: the measurement error on prices should
have a variance 9 times higher than the variance of the observed prices. If we
rather assume that βtrue is zero, we would need σ
2
η = 0.16: this value is equal
to the variance of price in the full sample of countries; hence the variance of
the measurement error in the sub-sample of poor countries should be as big as
the overall variance of prices that we observe over the full data set.
Therefore, even if measurement error could potentially drive my result,
an implausible variance of the measurement error itself is required to get the
negative price-income relationship presented in the paper.
Bias from the mean of measurement error
In Figure 1.12 we can see that if PPPs are systematically underestimated
in poor countries, measurement error would deliver a stronger Penn-BS effect;
the reverse would be true if PPPs tend to be overestimated.15 It is easy to
show that the same argument applies in the case of a negative price-income
relationship: if PPPs tend to be more underestimated in poor countries than in
middle-income ones, the true price-income relationship would be more negative
than the estimated one. Therefore, it is crucial to understand if measurement
errors in computing PPPs tend to overestimate or underestimate the true PPPs
in low-income countries.
The process of computing PPPs is subject to intrinsic fragilities, making
15The underlying assumption in the figure is that measurement error of PPPs affects
poorer countries only.
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comparisons of real income and prices across countries a difficult exercise.
Deaton and Heston (2010) and the ICP Handbook (2007) stress that the main
sources of bias in PPPs’ estimation are the method of aggregation, quality
matching and good representativity.
The PWTs compute PPPs using the Geary-Khamis (GK) method of ag-
gregation: the PPP index of a country is computed as a modified Paasche
index that compares domestic prices with world prices. In the GK method
the world price of a good is defined as a weighted average of countries’ price
where the weights are given by a country’s consumption share at the global
level. This implies that countries with a larger physical volume of consump-
tion get a greater weight in the construction of the composite world prices;
so that the international price used to evaluate consumption in all countries
is closer to the price in rich countries. As Deaton and Heston (2010) point
out, this creates a Gershenkron effect for low income countries: if we measure
their consumption by prices that are closer to those of rich countries, their
consumption is overvalued. Therefore, the GK method of aggregation tends
to understate PPPs in low-income countries.
The method of aggregation is not the only source of bias in PPPs. Quality
matching and goods representativity may also affect our results. As Deaton
and Heston (2010) stress, one of the most criticized issues of ICP rounds is that
lower quality goods and services in poor countries are often matched to higher
quality items in rich countries. Quality mismatch leads to an underestimation
of the price level in poor countries.
The representativity of the goods priced could also bias PPPs. In each
country the ICP calculates prices for about 155 goods (called basic headings)
12
by collecting prices for 1500-2000 items. A basic heading is the most disag-
gregated level at which expenditure data are available from national accounts
statistics. The ICP collects quotes for different items within each basic head
and then aggregates them with different procedures.16 If an item within the
basic heading is representative in some countries but not in others, PPPs may
be estimated incorrectly.17 This is a common problem for all ICP rounds.18
Nevertheless, Diewert (2008) argues that if non-representative prices are
well-distributed across all countries in a region, they may not cause serious
distortions. Moreover, Deaton (2010) computes a Tornqvist index to measure
how much different goods moves the overall PPP-index in Africa and Asia.19
He then concludes that there is no evidence to support the idea that prices
in Africa or in the Asia-Pacific region are systematically overstated by the
representativity issue.
Another source of concern could be the difference between urban and rural
prices. Feenstra et al. (2012) show that in China the price level has been
overstated because of a urban bias in the data collection. In order to account
for this bias the PWT introduces a uniform reduction of 20% to the ICP
prices. This adjustment is consistent with their estimates of China’s real GDP.
Our results account for this downward revision. However, there is no clear
evidence of price overestimation for other countries due to the urban bias.
Actually Atkin and Donaldson (2012) show that the price of detailed products
16For instance, for the basic heading rice, the ICP collects quotes for six different kinds
of rice, including long-grained, short-grained, and brown rice. See Rao (2004) for a detailed
explanation of the items’ methods of aggregation
17See for instance the wheat vs. teff example in Deaton and Heston (2010).
18The Latin American region tried to overcome this issue in the 2005 round by using an
extended CPD method, adding a representativity dummy. The OECD/Eurostat and CIS
regions used an EKS method based on Javon indexes of representative products between
countries; see Hill (2007b) for a brief description of this method.
19He estimates a pairwise Tornqvist index for the ring African countries vs. the UK and
at regional level for Africa and Asia-Pacific vs. OECD/Eursotat.
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in Ethiopia and Nigeria are on average 5-12% higher in rural areas.
To summarize, the method of aggregation and quality matching tend to
understate PPPs in low-income countries respect to the ”true” values. More-
over, there is no evidence that products representativity systematically biases
PPPs upwards and that the urban bias affect the countries on the downward
sloping path. If that’s the case, the non-monotonicity showed in section 2 is
actually a lower-bound of the true one.
1.3.2 PWT structure: benchmark analysis and black
market exchange rates
The Penn World Tables (PWT) rely on data from the International Com-
parison Program (ICP) which collects prices only in benchmark years and
benchmark countries. The PWT estimates PPPs for other years through
rescaling according to the inflation rate differential with the US. Whereas,
the PPPs of countries where the ICP did not collect prices are estimated by a
two-stage process based on the relationship between nominal and real shares
for the benchmark countries.20
In figure 1.13 I run a non-linear estimation of the price-income relationship
only for benchmark years and benchmark countries of subsequent versions of
the PWT.21 As Bergin et alt. (2006) stress, the overall measurement error for
benchmark samples is low. Even if I restrict the analysis to these more reliable
samples, the non-monotonicity of the price-income relationship is confirmed.
20For details on the estimation procedure see the appendix to PWT.
21I use PWT 5.6 for 1985, PWT 6.1 for 1996, and PWT 7 for 2005
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As a robustness check for the panel analysis, I focus on the University
of Queensland International Comparisons Database (UQICD). The UQICD
computes PPPs through an econometric model constructed using information
contained in all the benchmark comparisons of the ICP, rather than through
extrapolations formed from a single benchmark only. Figure 1.14 shows the
fitted values of a LOWESS estimation from a panel that includes only the
benchmark years and the benchmark countries of the ICP rounds in 1985,1996,
and 2005. This is a very limited sample of 47 countries that excludes most of
the low-income countries of the previous estimations. Despite that, figure 1.14
confirms the non-monotonicity of the price-income relationship.
Another point worth to highlight is that the exchange rate that PWT uses
to compute the price level is the official one. In developing countries the official
exchange rate can greatly differ from the one used in daily transactions, above
all in the early years of our sample. Nevertheless, this issue does not under-
mine the finding of the paper. In fact, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) argue,
multiple exchange rate arrangements decreased greatly over time and the non-
monotonicity of the price-income relationship that the paper documents holds
also for the year 2005. Moreover, in figure 1.15 I report the non-parametric
estimation of price on income using black market exchange rates for the year
1996.22 The non-monotonicity of the relationship is confirmed also in this case.
Finally, the analysis in Section 1.2 refers to the PWT 7.0 database. This
relies on the 2005 ICP round, which provides arguably the best available data
for international comparisons of real income. The PPPs of many developing
countries were revised upwards after this round, and these countries have a
22Data on black market rates are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (1996). Prices are
computed dividing PPPs from PWT 6.1 by the black market exchange rates. I choose the
year 1996 because this is the oldest benchmark year for which raw PPPs are available.
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lower real income than was previously thought (Deaton, 2010). Although
higher PPPs in poor countries work in favor of my findings, the last ICP
round does not drive the results of the paper. The results presented in section
1.2 holds also for previous versions of the PWTs. 23
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer are working on a new version of the Penn
World Tables that will provide price and real GDP data not only on the expen-
diture side, but also on the output side. Moreover, in order to derive a time
series of price and income, it will rely on historical benchmarks of the ICP and
not only on national accounts as it is currently the case. It is not clear how
these new two dimensions will affect the analysis of the paper. Nevertheless,
this new data set will allow further analysis of the price-income relationship.
1.3.3 LOWESS estimation: alternative bandwidths
Section 1.2 briefly discussed the trade off between smoothness and bias
in choosing the bandwidth for the LOWESS estimation. A large bandwidth
includes observations from other part of the density increasing the risk of bias.
A small bandwidth can better capture the true feature of the data, but at
the cost of higher variance. The analysis hitherto presented used the default
bandwidth of STATA which is 0.8. This is a large value that may lead to a
biased estimation of the non-parametric pattern of the data.
In figure 1.16 I report non-parametric estimations of the same sample of
figure 4, but using a bandwidth of 1 and of 0.4. We can see that with a band-
width of 1, which is the maximum, nothing changes respect to the estimation
of figure 1.4. However in the case of a 0.4 bandwidth, the non-monotonicity
23Details available upon request.
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of the price-income relationship is stronger: the negative pattern now includes
33% of the sample and it becomes positive only after a level of income of 2,604
PPP$ equivalent to that of Mongolia in the year 2005. This suggests that the
non-monotonicity presented in section 1.2 can be a lower-bound of the true
one.
This section has shown that the results of the paper are robust to possible
bias in PPPs estimation; that they hold for benchmark years and countries;
that are not affected by using black market exchange rates; and that different
bandwidths in the non-parametric estimation would reinforce the results. All
this provides evidence that the non-monotonicity of the price-income relation-
ship is not a spurious result, but a hitherto undocumented economic fact.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper I show that the relationship between the price and the income
level is non-monotonic. To my knowledge this is an original finding and it
is a hitherto undocumented empirical regularity. This result contradicts the
conventional wisdom of a positive price-income relationship, which draws upon
a linear estimation. If I apply a non-parametric estimation, the price-income
relationship turns out to be significantly negative in poor countries. This
finding is robust along both cross-section and panel dimensions. The new
evidence presented in this paper raises general questions about the relationship
between the process of economic development and the price level, as well as
about the long-run determinants of real exchange rate in poor countries.
In fact, the standard Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which provides the
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mainstream explanation for the Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect, cannot explain
the negative price-income relationship in poor countries. This hypothesis relies
on the assumption that higher income countries have relatively higher produc-
tivity in the tradable sector. Accounting for free labor mobility between the
tradable and non-tradable sectors and for the law of one price, higher relative
productivity in the tradable sector leads to higher wages in both sectors and
to higher price in the non-tradable sector, hence to a higher overall price level.
For a negative price-income relationship, we would need richer countries to be
characterized by lower productivity in the tradable sector, but the empirical
evidence does not support this option.
The next paper analyses possible explanations of the non-monotonic pat-
tern of the price-income relationship. The focus is going to be on the different
stage of development that characterizes low- and high-income countries and
the process of structural transformation that developing countries undergo.
A possible empirical extension of the paper could focus on regional variation
within countries like India or China, where there are regions at very different
stages of development. This kind of regional variation would also be ideal to
verify if the process of structural transformation that the next paper analyzes
is at the basis of the non-monotonic price-income relationship.
This paper lays the ground for further theoretical and empirical research
on the relationship between economic development and the price level. The
results presented, although surprising, should not be disturbing. It is probable
that Samuelson himself would not have been startled. In his 1994 article for
the thirty-year anniversary of the Balassa-Samuelson model, he wrote that
” The Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect is an important phenomenon of actual
18
history but not an inevitable fact of life. It can quantitatively vary and, in
different times and places, trace to quite different processes”.
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1. Appendix: countries in the cross-section
analysis of section
Albania Congo, Rep. of Israel Namibia Sudan
Angola Cote d‘Ivoire Italy Nepal Swaziland
Argentina Croatia Japan Netherlands Sweden
Armenia Czech Republic Jordan New Zealand Switzerland
Australia Denmark Kazakhstan Niger Syria
Austria Ecuador Kenya Nigeria Taiwan
Azerbaijan Egypt Korea, Rep. of Norway Tanzania
Bangladesh Estonia Kuwait Oman Thailand
Belarus Ethiopia Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Togo
Belgium Finland Laos Paraguay Tunisia
Benin France Latvia Peru Turkey
Bolivia Gabon Lebanon Philippines Uganda
Bosnia and Herz. Gambia, The Lesotho Poland Ukraine
Botswana Georgia Liberia Portugal Sweden
Brazil Germany Lithuania Romania Switzerland
Bulgaria Ghana Macedonia Russia Syria
Burkina Faso Greece Madagascar Rwanda Taiwan
Cambodia Guinea Malawi Saudi Arabia Tanzania
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Malaysia Senegal United Kingdom
Canada Hong Kong Mali Serbia United States
Central Afr. Rep. Hungary Mauritania Sierra Leone Uruguay
Chad Guinea-Bissau Mauritius Singapore Venezuela
Chile India Mexico Slovak Rep. Vietnam
China Version 1 Indonesia Moldova Slovenia Yemen
China Version 2 Iran Mongolia South Africa Zambia
Colombia Iraq Morocco Spain
Congo, Dem. Rep. Ireland Mozambique Sri Lanka
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1. Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Price Level and Income - Rogoff (1996)
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Figure 1.2: Price Level and Income - Rogoff (1996); log-income & non-param.
estimation
Figure 1.3: Price level and Income PWT 7.0, benchmark countries, 2005:
Linear Estimation
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Figure 1.4: Price level and Income PWT 7.0, benchmark countries, 2005: Non-
Parametric Estimation
Figure 1.5: Countries on the downward sloping arm: cross-section dimension
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Figure 1.6: Price and Income PWT 7.0, benchmark countries, 2005: Non-
Parametric Estimation, 95% confidence bands
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Table 1.1: Cross-country OLS regression by income ranking, year 2005
Dependent var: ln p ln y
1st Third -0.135**
(-2.05)
2nd Third 0.145
(1.17)
3rd Third 0.514***
(6.90)
Full sample 0.20***
(9.67)
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at
the 10% level; robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
Figure 1.7: Prices and Income 1950-2009: Non-Parametric Estimation
25
Figure 1.8: Prices and Income 1950-2009: Non-Parametric Estimation
Figure 1.9: Prices and Income 1950-2009: Non-Parametric Estimation, fitted
values
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Figure 1.10: Countries on the downward sloping arm: panel dimension
Table 1.2: Panel evidence on price level and real income
Dependent var: ln p Full Sample Developing Countries
(1) (2) (1) (2)
ln RGDPCH 0.109*** 0.103 -0.125** -0.138*
(2.55) (1.56) (-1.95) (-1.78)
Country, fe NO YES NO YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES
No. of countries 149 149 107 107
Avg obs per country 46.1 46.1 45.7 45.7
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at
the 1% level; robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
27
Figure 1.11: Price-Income, time series dimension: developing vs. developed
countries, selected cases
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Figure 1.12: The effect of PPPs bias
29
Figure 1.13: Price and income: benchmark years and countries
30
Figure 1.14: Price and income: panel of benchmark years and countries,
UNIQD. Non-parametric estimation, fitted values
Figure 1.15: Prices and Income 1996 using black-market exchange rates: Non-
Parametric Estimation
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Figure 1.16: Price and Income, PWT 7.0, benchmark countries, 2005: Non-
Parametric Estimation with different bandwidths
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Chapter 2
The Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis, structural
transformation, and the price
level
2.1 Introduction
The most accepted explanation of the Penn-Balassa-Samuelson effect is the
Balassa-Samuelson (BS) hypothesis. This explanation focuses on productivity
differentials between the tradable and the non-tradable sector. Assuming free
labor mobility across sectors and that the law of one price holds for tradables,
the BS hypothesis shows that countries with higher relative productivity in
the tradable sector have a higher price level. Since richer countries tend to
have higher relative productivity in the tradable sector, the price level should
then raise with per-capita income.
In order to capture the non-monotonicity of the price-income relationship,
this paper argues that we need a modified BS framework that accounts for the
relevance of the agricultural sector in poor countries and for the fact that low-
income and high-income countries have very different economic structures and
are at different stages of development. In table 2.1, I consider the benchmark
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countries of PWT 7 for the year 2005. I rank countries by their level of income
and divide the sample into three groups. Then, following the tradition of the
development macroeconomics literature, I focus on a sectoral division of the
economy between agriculture, manufacturing, and services.
We can see that the countries in the bottom group of income have a remark-
ably different structure in terms of valued added, expenditure, and employment
shares. The most significant differences refer to the agricultural sector: the
group of countries where the price-income relationship is negative have a 10
times higher valued added share in agriculture, a 4 times higher expenditure
share and a 9 times higher employment share than the countries in the top
group of income. This clearly reflects the early stage of development that
characterizes these countries.
If structural change is an important determinant of the non-monotonicity of
the price-income relationship, we should observe some degree of non-monotonicity
when the price level is regressed against key indicators of structural change.
Figure 2.1 confirms this by showing a non-monotonic pattern of the price level
respect to employment and expenditure shares in agriculture.
The differences in value added, expenditure and employment shares high-
lighted in table 2.1 are associated to a different structure of relative prices.
Using disaggregated data kindly provided by the International Comparison
Program at the World Bank, I can compute sectoral PPPs and price levels
(table 2.1).1 Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, the relative price of
1The price level of sector i is given by pi = PPPi/XRAT with p
US
i = 1. In order
to preserve aggregation at the GDP level, I use the Geary-Khamis method to compute
sectoral PPPs. See the appendix for a detailed description of goods’ sectoral classification;
as suggested by Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2011) I map the agricultural sector with the
food sector.
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agriculture in terms of both services and manufacturing turns to be higher in
low-income countries than in rich-countries.2 The key result of this exercise is
that, whereas the average price level of services and manufacturing increases
by income group, the price level of agriculture decreases between the bottom
and the intermediate group. Non-parametric estimations of sectoral prices on
income confirm this pattern: figures 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 show that the price dynamics
of the agricultural sector accounts for most of the non-monotonicity of the
overall price-income relationship. This clearly points out that the cause of the
negative pattern should be related to the dynamics of the agricultural sector.
The explanation for the non-monotonic price-income relationship that this
paper proposes is therefore the following: When a poor country starts to de-
velop, its productivity growth relies mainly in the agricultural sector. This
allows for a reduction of the relative price of agricultural goods. Since in a
country at an early stage of development, agriculture represents a big share
of both expenditure and value added production, there is an overall reduction
of the price level. After a certain stage of development the share of the agri-
cultural sector in the economy decreases. Hence the previous effect fades out
and productivity gains from the manufacturing sector becomes a more impor-
tant source of growth, so that we are back to the standard Balassa-Samuelson
mechanism.
The two key elements of this explanation are that productivity growth in
the agricultural sector is higher than in other sectors and that agricultural
goods are not tradable. Duarte and Restuccia (2010) show for a panel of 29
countries between 1956-2004 that productivity growth was 4% in agriculture,
3% in manufacturing and 1.3% in services; moreover Ngai and Pissarides (2007)
2Caselli (2005) hints at this possibility in a footnote. Lagakos and Waugh (2012) have a
similar finding.
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calibrate US TFP growth between 1929-1998 such that it is 1% higher in
agriculture than in manufacturing and 1% higher in manufacturing than in
services.
As for the non-tradability of agricultural goods, this is a reasonable assump-
tion for low-income countries. On average the share of agricultural exports to
agricultural GDP is 17% for the groups of countries with a negative price-
income relationship, 45% for the middle group, and 98% for the top group
with a positive relationship. Moreover, as Gollin et al. (2007) stress, FAO re-
ports show that about 70% of arable land in 159 developing countries is devoted
to staple food crops. With the exception of few developing countries, almost
all of the resulting production was for domestic consumption. Moreover, food
imports and food aid are not a major source of food consumptiom for poor
countries: imports of food supply around 5% of total calories consumed.
2.2 The Balassa-Samuelson+ framework
This section develops a model that links the price level of a country to its
process of structural transformation. It derives a consumption-based price
index from the utility function, within a modified version of the Balassa-
Samuelson framework. Then, it expresses the consumption shares of that
index as a function of the employment shares. In this way the price level can
reflect a country’s stage of development. The purpose of this exercise is to add
some minimal feature to the standard Balassa-Samuleson model in order to
capture the effect that process of structural transformation has on the price
level; for this reason I label the following framework ”Balassa-Samuleson +”.
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2.2.1 Model set-up
Production functions are given by:
Fi(ki, li) = Aik
α
i l
1−α
i ; i = a,m, s (2.1)
Factors’ market clearing satisfies:
m∑
i=1
li = 1;
m∑
i=1
ki = k; (2.2)
Moreover, we have that Fi = ci for i = a, s. We also assume that manufacturing
produces both a final consumption good and the economy’s capital stock so
that k˙ = Fm − cm − (δ + n)k.
The underlying assumptions of the model, as in the Balassa-Samuelson
framework, are that manufacturing is the only tradable and that trade is bal-
anced period by period. These imply that the effect of trade is to equalize
the price of manufacturing across countries and that there is financial au-
tarky, which is a reasonable assumption for low-income countries. The pur-
pose of these assumption is to have a model as close as possible to the standard
Balassa-Samuelson framework, in order to be able to highlight better the im-
plications of accounting for the process of structural transformation.
The utility function is assumed to have constant elasticities across goods
so that:
U(ca, cm, cs) =
[
γ
1
θ
a c
θ−1
θ
a + γmc
θ−1
θ
m + γsc
θ−1
θ
s
] θ
θ−1
(2.3)
37
2.2.2 The Consumption-Based Price Index
The consumption-based price index P is defined as the minimum expendi-
ture:
z = Paca + Pmcm + Pscs (2.4)
such that c = U(ca, cm, cs) = 1 given Pi.
So defined, the consumption-based price index measures the least expendi-
ture that buys a unit of the consumption index on which period utility depends.
From consumer’s utility maximization we know that:
MUi
MUj
=
Pi
Pj
(2.5)
so that: (
γa
γm
) 1
θ
(
cm
ca
) 1
θ
=
Pa
Pm
; ca =
γa
γm
cm
(
Pa
Pm
)−θ
(2.6)
and (
γs
γm
) 1
θ
(
cm
cs
) 1
θ
=
Ps
Pm
; cs =
γs
γm
cm
(
Ps
Pm
)−θ
(2.7)
Substituting ca and cs from (2.6) and (2.7) into (2.4) we have:
z =
P 1−θa
P−θm
γa
γm
cm + Pmcm +
P 1−θs
P−θm
γs
γm
cm (2.8)
so that rearranging:
cm =
γmP
−θ
m z
γaP 1−θa + γmP 1−θm + γsP 1−θs
(2.9)
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and consequently:
ca =
γaP
−θ
a z
γaP 1−θa + γmP 1−θm + γsP 1−θs
(2.10)
cs =
γsP
−θ
s z
γaP 1−θa + γmP 1−θm + γsP 1−θs
(2.11)
Equations (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) are the demands that maximize c given
spending z. The highest value of the utility function given z is found by
substituting these demands into (2.3), such that:
[
γ
1
θ
a
(
γaP
−θ
a z
x
) θ−1
θ
+ γ
1
θ
m
(
γmP
−θ
m z
x
) θ−1
θ
+ γ
1
θ
s
(
γsP
−θ
s z
x
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
(2.12)
where x = γaP
1−θ
a + γmP
1−θ
m + γsP
1−θ
s .
Since P is defined as the minimum expenditure z such that c = 1 we have:
[
γ
1
θ
a
(
γaP
−θ
a P
x
) θ−1
θ
+ γ
1
θ
m
(
γmP
−θ
m P
x
) θ−1
θ
+ γ
1
θ
s
(
γsP
−θ
s P
x
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
= 1
(2.13)
from which the solution for P is:
P =
(
γaP
1−θ
a + γmP
1−θ
m + γsP
1−θ
s
) 1
1−θ (2.14)
This is the consumption-based price index consistent with the CES utility
function specified in equation (2.3). When θ = 1 the utility function becomes
Cobb-Douglas; in this case the price index becomes:
logP =
log(γaP
1−θ
a + γmP
1−θ
m + γsP
1−θ
s )
1− θ (2.15)
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Applying L’Hopital’s rule we have:
lim
θ→1
log(γaP
1−θ
a + γmP
1−θ
m + γsP
1−θ
s )
1− θ =
f(θ)
g(θ)
= lim
θ→1
f ′(θ)
g′(θ)
= γa logPa+γm logPm+γs logPs
(2.16)
so that for the Cobb-Douglas case, the consumption-based price index is given
by the standard expression:
logP = γa logPa + γm logPm + γs logPs (2.17)
Accounting for the cross-country equalization of the price of manufacturing
through trade and normalizing it to one, the consumption-based price index
can be written as:
logP = γa log pa + γs log ps (2.18)
2.2.3 Relative prices, consumption shares and employ-
ment
From the supply-side, static efficiency condition requires equal marginal
rate of technical substitution across sectors, so that ki = k; while free move-
ment of capital and labor leads to equal remuneration of the factors of pro-
duction. Therefore, firms’ profit maximization implies:
Pa
Pm
=
Am
Aa
(2.19)
Ps
Pm
=
As
Aa
(2.20)
From consumer’s optimality conditions (2.6) and (2.7) we can define the
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relative expenditure of agriculture and services respect to manufacturing as:
Paca
Pmcm
=
γa
γm
(
Pa
Pm
)1−θ
≡ xa (2.21)
Pscs
Pmcm
=
γs
γm
(
Ps
Pm
)1−θ
≡ xs (2.22)
We then define X = xa + xs + xm, where clearly xm = 1. We also define:
c ≡
m∑
i=1
Pici; y ≡
m∑
i=1
PiF
i (2.23)
Using equations (2.21) and (2.22) and the efficiency conditions, we can
rewrite equations (2.23) as:
c = PmcmX; y = PmAmk
α (2.24)
Notice that the technology parameter for output is TFP in manufacturing not
an average of all sectors.
As in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) we can link relative expenditure with the
employment shares. If we substitute we substitute F i = ci for i = a, s in (2.21)
and (2.22), using the market clearing conditions in (2.2), we can show that it
results:
la =
c
y
xa
X
(2.25)
ls =
c
y
xs
X
(2.26)
The employment share in the manufacturing sector is derived by firstly
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observing that lm = 1− la − ls, so that we have:
lm =
c
y
xm
X
+
(
1− c
y
)
(2.27)
Let’s consider the price index (2.18), where θ = 1 and manufacturing is the
numeraire. We can substitute for γa and γs from (2.21) and (2.22), so that we
have:
logP = xaγm log pa + γmxs log ps (2.28)
Substituting for pa and ps from (2.19) and (2.20) we have:
logP = xaγm(logAm − logAa) + γmxs(logAm − logAs)
= γm [xa(logAm − logAa) + xs(logAm − logAa)] (2.29)
Substituting for xa and xs from (2.25) and (2.26) we have:
logP = γm
[
laX
c/y
(logAm − logAa) + lsX
c/y
(logAm − logAa)
]
(2.30)
If we define c/y = 1 − σ we can rearrange (2.27) such that X = 1−σ
lm−σ .
Therefore the price index is given by:
logPBS+ = γm
[
la
lm − σ (logAm − logAa) +
ls
lm − σ (logAm − logAs)
]
(2.31)
where li is the employment share of sector i, Ai is TFP in sector i. I label
it Balassa-Samuelson+ price index.
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2.3 The Price-Income relationship: Balassa-
Samuelson vs. Balassa-Samuelson+
In this section I compute the price level implied by the standard Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis and by the ”Balassa-Samuleson+” hypothesis. I then
use these price levels to estimate the price-income relationship non-parametrically
and compare the fitted values with the actual pattern of the data.
Under the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the price level of a country is:
logPBS = γNT (logAT − logANT ) (2.32)
where γNT is the expenditure share of non-tradables.
The difference between (2.31) and (2.32) is that in the Balassa-Samuelson+
there is a better focus on the agricultural sector and that the sectoral relative
TFPs of agriculture and services are weighted by the relative employment
shares, so that the price index reflects the stage of structural transformation
at which countries are.
In order to compute these price levels, employment shares are taken by
the WDI database and by national sources. The saving rate σ is set equal to
the share of investment in GDP. The consumption share in manufacturing γm
is given by the expenditure share in manufacturing computed from the ICP
database. I obtain sectoral estimates of TFP across countries following the
methodology of Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2011).3
3I am able to compute the price levels for 60 countries out of 127 because of the lack of
sectoral employment data in many poor countries and lack of investment data in middle-
income and former URSS countries.
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2.3.1 Sectoral TFPs
Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2011) elaborate a sectoral development account-
ing framework that allows to compute sectoral TFPs using PWT. The key
assumptions of their methodology are: competitive markets; factor’s mobility
across sectors; Cobb-Douglas production function with factor shares common
to all countries.
The production function for sector i in country z is given by:
yzi = A
z
i (k
z
i )
θi(lzi )
φi(hzi )
1−θi−φi (2.33)
where k is capital, l is land, and h is human capital.
Under the assumption stated above, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2011) show
that the sectoral factors of production are:
kzi =
θip
z
i y
z
i∑
j θjp
z
jy
z
j
∑
i
kzi (2.34)
lzi =
φip
z
i y
z
i∑
j φjp
z
jy
z
j
∑
i
lzi (2.35)
hzi =
(1− θi − φi)pzi yzi∑
j(1− θj − φj)pzjyzj
∑
i
hzi (2.36)
In order to compute sectoral TFPs, I take the sectoral factor shares from
Herrendorf and Valntinyi (2011), who calculate them from the US input-output
tables. Then, following their methodology, I compute the capital stock in the
economy kz with the perpetual inventory method as in Caselli (2005).4 Land
lz is arable land for agriculture and urban land for manufacturing and services.
4I exclude countries with data on investment starting only after the ’70s; this also con-
tributes to limit the sample of countries for which I can compute the price index.
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I take data on arable land from FAOSTAT and following World Bank (2006)
estimates, I set urban land equal to 24% of physical capital. Finally, I compute
human capital hz as in Caselli (2005) and it is a piecewise increasing function
of average years of schooling per worker.
2.3.2 Models’ predictions
Figure 2.5 shows the fitted values of the non-parametric estimation of the
price-income relationship, where prices are given by equation (2.32): I am able
to confirm the strictly positive relationship predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis.
Figure 2.6 shows that the price implied by the ”Balassa-Samuleson+” hy-
pothesis allows for more flexibility in the price-income relationship and can
generate a negative pattern at low levels of development. Therefore, by taking
into account that countries are at a different stage of their process of struc-
tural transformation, I am able to match better the actual pattern of the data
reported in figure 2.7.
Table 2.2 analyzes the quantitative fit: under the BS+ hypothesis 26% of
countries in the sample are on the downward sloping path of the price-income
relationship; in the standard BS hypothesis this is 0% and in the actual data it
is 22% of the sample. The variance of prices generated by the BS+ hypothesis
is two and half times higher than in the data (1.02 vs 0.41). Finally, the
turning point of the BS+ model is around 3,000 PPP$, but in the data it is
around 1,400 PPP$.
The quantitative result of the ”Balassa-Samuleson+” hypothesis clearly
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outperforms that of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. The model derived in
this paper is relatively simple and a richer approach that accounts for other fac-
tors like the tradability of agriculture in rich countries or the reduction of trade
costs as a country develops might deliver a better quantitative fit. However
the results presented are encouraging and lay the ground for further theoretical
and empirical research on the relationship between structural change and the
price level.
2.4 Conclusions
The paper shows that the dynamics that characterize the agricultural sector
are the main drivers of the non-monotonic pattern of the price-income rela-
tionship. This suggests that, in order to capture the non-monotonicity of the
data, we should consider the different stage of development at which countries
are.
The paper proposes a modified version of the Balassa-Samuelson hypoth-
esis, labeled ”Balassa-Samuelson +”. The main points of this framework are
that: it focuses on a three-sectors decomposition between agriculture, man-
ufacturing and services; agriculture is considered non-tradable; in the overall
price level the relative TFPs of agriculture and services are weighted by the
respective employment shares. In this framework the price level can capture
the different stage of development at which countries are.
The results of the paper show that linking the price level to the process
of structural transformation that characterize developing countries can gener-
ate a non-monotonic pattern of the price-income relationship. The Balassa-
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Samuelson+ framework outperforms the standard Balassa-Samuleson hypoth-
esis in matching the data. This result suggests that structural change and,
more in general, inter-sectoral dynamics can be important determinants of
real exchange rates movements.
The next chapter introduces a multisector Eaton-Kortum model of trade
as in Michaels et al. (2011) and Tombe (2012). This approach might deliver
a better quantitative prediction because, through endogenous tradability, it
relaxes the assumption of agriculture being non-tradable and it accounts for
the role played by trade costs.
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2. Appendix: ICP 2005, classification of goods
BS-SC framework: BS-framework:
Category Basic Heading Sector allocation Tradability
Rice A T
Other cereals and flour A T
Bread A T
Other bakery products A T
Pasta products A T
Beef and veal A T
Pork A T
Lamb, mutton and goat A T
Poultry A T
Other meats and preparations A T
Fresh or frozen fish and seafood A T
Preserved fish and seafood A T
Food Fresh milk A T
Preserved milk and milk products A T
Cheese A T
Eggs and egg-based products A T
Butter and margarine A T
Other edible oils and fats A T
Fresh or chilled fruit A T
Frozen, preserved or processed fruits A T
Fresh or chilled vegetables A T
Fresh or chilled potatoes A T
Frozen or preserved vegetables A T
Sugar A T
Jams, marmalades and honey A T
Confectionery, chocolate and ice cream A T
Food products n.e.c. A T
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BS-SC framework: BS-framework:
Category Basic Heading Sector allocation Tradability
Coffee, tea and cocoa M T
Mineral waters,soft drinks,fruit and veg
juices
M T
Beverages Spirits M T
and Wine M T
tobacco Beer M T
Tobacco M T
Clothing materials and accessories M T
Clothing Garments M T
and Cleaning and repair of clothing S NT
footwear Footwear M T
Repair and hire of footwear S NT
Actual and imputed rentals for housing S NT
Maintenance and repair of the dwelling S NT
Housing,
water,
Water supply and miscellaneous ser-
vices relating to the dwelling
S NT
electricity
and gas
Miscellaneous services relating to the
dwelling
S NT
Electricity M T
Gas M T
Other fuels M T
Furniture and furnishings M T
Carpets and other floor coverings M T
Furniture,
household
Repair of furniture, furnishings and
floor coverings
S NT
equipment Household textiles M T
and
maintenance
Major household appliances whether
electric or not
M T
Small electric household appliances M T
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BS-SC framework: BS-framework:
Category Basic Heading Sector allocation Tradability
Repair of household appliances S NT
Furniture,
household
Glassware, tableware and household
utensils
M T
equipment Major tools and equipment M T
and
maintenance
Small tools and miscellaneous acces-
sories
M T
Non-durable household goods M T
Domestic services S NT
Household services S NT
Pharmaceutical products M T
Other medical products M T
Therapeutical appliances and equip-
ment
M T
Health Medical Services S NT
Dental services S NT
Paramedical services S NT
Hospital services S NT
Motor cars M T
Motor cycles M T
Bicycles M T
Fuels and lubricants for personal trans-
port equipment
M T
Maintenance and repair of personal
transport equipment
S NT
Transport Other services in respect of personal
transport equipment
S NT
Passenger transport by railway S NT
Passenger transport by road S NT
Passenger transport by air S NT
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BS-SC framework: BS-framework:
Category Basic Heading Sector allocation Tradability
Passenger transport by sea and inland
waterway
S NT
Transport Combined passenger transport S NT
Other purchased transport services S NT
Postal services S NT
Communica Telephone and telefax equipment M T
tion Telephone and telefax services S NT
Audio-visual, photographic and infor-
mation processing equipment
M T
Recording media M T
Repair of audio-visual, photographic
and information processing equipment
S NT
Major durables for outdoor and indoor
recreation
M T
Recreation
and culture
Other recreational items and equip-
ment
M T
Gardens and pets S NT
Veterinary and other services for pets S NT
Recreational and sporting services S NT
Cultural services S NT
Games of chance S NT
Newspapers, books and stationery S NT
Package holidays S NT
Education Education S NT
Restaurant Catering services S NT
and hotels Accommodation services S NT
Miscellaneous
goods
Hairdressing salons and personal
grooming establishments
S NT
and services Appliances, articles and products for
personal care
S NT
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BS-SC framework: BS-framework:
Category Basic Heading Sector allocation Tradability
Prostitution S NT
Jewellery, clocks and watches M T
Other personal effects M T
Miscellaneous Social protection S NT
goods and Insurance S NT
services FISIM S NT
Other financial services n.e.c S NT
Other services n.e.c. S NT
Government compensation of employ-
ees
S NT
Government Government intermediate consumption M T
expenditure Government gross operating surplus S NT
Government net taxes on production S NT
Government receipts from sales S NT
Metal products and equipment M T
Transport equipment M T
Capital Residential buildings M T
formation Non-residential buildings M T
Civil engineering works M T
Other products M T
Inventories Changes in inventories and acquisitions M T
A=agriculture; M=manufacturing; S=services; T=tradable;
NT=non-tradable.
The sectoral allocation and the tradability allocation apply respectively to
the estimation of the Balassa-Samuelson-Structural-Change and the Balassa-
Samuelson framework in section 5.
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2. Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Price-income relationship and the stage of development
1st Third 2nd Third 3rd Third
price-income relationship -0.135** 0.14 0.51***
Value-added share of GDP
Agriculture 30.46 11.09 2.84
Manufacturing 26.42 37.00 31.95
Services 43.12 51.92 65.21
Employment share
Agriculture 60.61 28.02 6.65
Manufacturing 10.50 22.10 26.01
Services 28.33 49.13 66.97
Expenditure share
Agriculture 35.08 20.45 8.47
Manufacturing 41.71 43.86 41.42
Services 20.28 25.15 29.91
Price level
Agriculture 0.67 0.63 1.06
Manufacturing 0.56 0.63 1.03
Services 0.19 0.27 0.77
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Figure 2.1: Price Level, Expenditure and Employment Share of Agriculture
(reversed scale): Non-Parametric Estimation
Figure 2.2: Price of Agriculture and Income: Non-Parametric Estimation
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Figure 2.3: Price of Manufacturing and Income: Non-Parametric Estimation
Figure 2.4: Price of Services and Income: Non-Parametric Estimation
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Figure 2.5: The price level in the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis: non-
parametric estimation of the price-income relationship, fitted values
Figure 2.6: The price level in the Balassa-Samuelson+ hypothesis: non-
parametric estimation of the price-income relationship, fitted values
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Figure 2.7: Penn World Table 7.0 (2005): non-parametric estimation of the
price-income relationship, fitted values
Table 2.2: Data and models
Data BS+ Model BS Model
Countries on the downward sloping path 22% 26% 0%
Price, Std. Deviation 0.41 1.02 0.02
Turning point 1,464 PPP$ 3,070 PPP -
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Chapter 3
The price-income relationship in
a multi sector Eaton-Kotum
model of trade
3.1 Introduction
This chapter departs from the standard Balassa-Samuelson framework and
takes the Eaton-Kortum model of trade as the main point of reference consid-
ering a multi-sectors extension. This allows to relax the assumptions of the
previous model where agriculture is completely non-tradable. In this model we
have endogenous tradability in both the agriculture and manufacturing sector,
so that potentially all countries can trade in those two sectors, but if actual
trade takes place it depends on trade costs and relative competitiveness.
The chapter shows that also within an Eaton-Kortum framework a non-
monotonic pattern of the price-income relationship emerges. This is additional
supporting evidence that the empirical results shown in chapter 1 are not
spurious given that two different types of model can generate a non-monotonic
relationship. Moreover the higher degree of flexibility of this model permits a
better quantitative fit respect to the previous one.
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Section 3.2 describes the set-up of the model; section 3.3 focuses on the
price level implied by the model and on how the key parameters and variables
are estimated in order to match moments of trade data; section 3.4 discusses
the estimates of the model and analyses the price-income relationship implied
by this framework; section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model set-up
Let’s consider a world economy characterized by many countries i = 1, ..., I.
Each country has three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services. Coun-
tries differ in terms of sectoral productivities and bilateral transport costs.
Labor is the only factor of production, is immobile across countries, and is
supplied inelastically with no disutility. Employment shares vary across sec-
tors and countries because of exogenous productivity differences.
3.2.1 Preferences and technology
Preferences are assumed to be CES so that:
Ui = [ψAiC
ρ
Ai + ψMiC
ρ
Mi + ψSiC
ρ
Si]
1
ρ , 0 <
1
1− ρ < 1 (3.1)
We assume that there is a partial complementarity across goods from differ-
ent sectors, so that the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one. Demand
parameters ψKi change across countries because of different real income and
tastes.
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The agriculture and the manufacturing sectors K are characterized by a
continuum of differentiated varieties z produced with a linear technology:
yKi(z) = AKi(z)LKi(z) (3.2)
As in Eaton-Kortum (2002), in each country technology is a random draw
across products and sectors from a Frechet distribution:
Pr(AKi(zK) ≤ z) = FKi(zK) = e−(x/AKi)−θK (3.3)
where AKi is the scale parameter that governs the average productivity for
each sector and country; the sectoral average productivity of each country is
proportional to AθKi with the constant of proportionality not depending on the
country. A higher AKi means that country i is more likely to draw a higher ef-
ficiency for each products of sector K. Variation in the productivity parameter
AKi across sectors and countries determines the distribution of employment
across countries within each sector. θK is the shape parameter that controls
the dispersion of productivity across products and within each sector for the
world economy. A higher θK implies less variability in productivity in sector
K across countries and so a lower incentive to trade.
A domestic firm aggregates the varieties z of sector K, either imported or
produced domestically, into a composite good through a CES technology with
an elasticity of substitution 1/(1− σ):
YKi =
[∫ 1
0
y˜
1−1/σ
Ki(z) dz
](σ/σ−1)
(3.4)
The service sector is characterized by a non-tradable composite good pro-
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duced with a linear technology such that:
YSi = ASiLSi (3.5)
3.2.2 Prices and trade flows
Products within each sector are produced in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment. Output can be traded across countries subject iceberg trade costs
dKij > 1 (from country j to country i).
1 Under this assumptions and the
technology specified above, the cost to a consumer in country i of purchasing
variety z of sector K from country j is:
pKij(z) =
wj
AKj(z)
dKij (3.6)
Given a homogeneous product, the representative consumer buys product
z from the lowest cost supplier, so that:
pKi(z) = min {pKij(z); j = 1, ..., I} (3.7)
The distribution of price within sector K faced by a representative consumer
in country i for goods sourced from country j is then:
GKij(pK) = Pr[pKij ≤ pK ] = 1− FKj
(
wj
pK
dKij
)
= 1− e−AKj(wjdKij)−θK pθKK
(3.8)
Since goods are sourced from the lowest cost supplier, the distribution of
prices within sector K in location i for the goods purchased is given by the
1The triangular inequality is assumed to hold so that dKij < dKindKnj
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distribution of the minimum, so that:
GKi(pK) = Pr [min {pKi1, pKi2, ..., pKiI} ≤ pK ] = 1−
I∏
i=1
[1−GKij(pK)] = 1−eφKip
θK
K
(3.9)
where
φKi =
I∑
s=1
AKs(wsdKis)
−θK (3.10)
so the distribution of prices of goods actually purchased depends on pro-
ductivity parameters, input costs, and trade costs across countries. If there
were no geographic barriers, so that dKij = 1, φ would be the same across
countries and the law of one price would hold for each good.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) The price distribution (3.9) has important
implications for defining the trade flows and the price index:
- Goods are sourced from the lowest cost supplier; so the probability that
country i purchases a good z from country j is :
piKij = Pr [pKij(z) ≤ min pKis(h); s 6= j] (3.11)
This probability can be expressed as:
piKij =
AKj(wjdKij)
−θK∑I
s=1AKs(wsdKis)
−θK
(3.12)
so that the share of expenditure of country i on products coming from
country j depend on the relative competitiveness of country j and the trade
costs between j and i.
- The distribution of prices in country i for products imported from any
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country j is independent of the identity of country j and equal to the distri-
bution of prices in location i. In fact the distribution of prices in location i
conditional on sourcing products from j is equal to the distribution of prices
GKi(pK) given by the distribution of the minimum across countries:
Pr[pKi ≤ pK | pi = pij] = GKi(pK) (3.13)
The intuition is that a source country j with higher productivity, lower
input and trade costs, takes advantage of this by expanding the extensive
margin, the number of products supplied, up to the point where the distri-
bution of prices that j sells to i is equal to the overall price distribution of
i.
- The sectoral price index under a CES utility function is given by:
PKi =
[∫ 1
0
pKi(z)
1−σdz
] 1
1−σ
(3.14)
It can be shown that exploiting the properties of the Frechet distribution,
the sectoral price can be written as:
PKi =
[
Γ
(
θK + 1− σ
θK
)] 1
1−σ
[
I∑
s=1
AKs(wsdKis)
−θK
]− 1
θK
(3.15)
where
[
Γ
(
θK+1−σ
θK
)] 1
1−σ ≡ γK
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The aggregate price index for the economy is then given by:
Pi = [ψ
κ
AP
1−κ
Ai +ψ
κ
MP
1−κ
Mi +ψ
κ
SP
1−κ
Si ]
1
1−κ =
 ∑
Z∈(A,M,S)
ψκZγ
1−κ
Z
[
I∑
s=1
AZs(wsdZis)
−θZ
]− 1
θZ

1
1−κ
(3.16)
3.2.3 Labor market clearing
Labor market clearing implies that for each sector payment to labor equals
the sum of expenditures on goods produced in that sector and country.
Payment to labor in each sector is equal to the sum of expenditures across
countries on goods produced in that sector and location:
wjLKj =
I∑
i=1
piKijλKiYi (3.17)
Labor market clearing in each country implies that the total income re-
ceived by workers equals the sum of payments to labor across sectors.
wjLj =
∑
K∈(A,M,S)
I∑
i=1
piKijλKiYi (3.18)
Dividing both sides 3.17by wjLj, sectoral labor shares can be written as:
LKj
Lj
=
I∑
i=1
piKijλKi
Yi
Yj
(3.19)
where Yi/Yj, measures the relative income size
Finally, sectoral labor demand are an aggregation of labor demand for each
variety LKi(z), such that LKi = [
∫ 1
0
LKi(z)dz]. For each country the labor
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market must clear so that: ∑
K
LKi = Li (3.20)
3.3 Technology, trade, and the price level
In this section I investigate the price level implied by the model in equa-
tion (3.16). Parameters are calibrated either to reflect accepted values in the
literature or to match key moments of trade data.
3.3.1 Parameters calibrated from the literature
Following Michaels et al. (2011), who refer to a vast literature in macroe-
conomics, I assume inelastic demand across sectors and set the elasticity of
substitution across sectors ρ equal to 0.5. As in Tombe (2013) the elasticity of
substitution across varieties σ is set such that γ = 1
Finally the parameters of the Frechet distribution that controls the dis-
persion of productivity across goods θK is set equal to 4. Simonovska and
Waugh (2011) develop a simulated method of moments estimator to estimate
this trade-cost elasticity from a large cross-country price and trade flows data.
They find that θ = 4 with a range between 2.5 and 5.5. 2 Moreover, θ is set
to be the same in all sectors. Caliendo and Parro (2012) using trade flows be-
tween Canada, Mexico, and the US find no difference in θ between agriculture
and manufacturing.
2This value is 50% lower than the original finding of Eaton-Kortum whose estimate is
shown to suffer of a finite sample bias
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3.3.2 Trade, import barriers, and competitiveness
In order to compute the price level implied by the model in (3.16) I need
estimates for AKi(widKij). Let’s define the state of technology of country i
adjusted by labor cost as country i competitiveness TKi ≡ AKiwi . Hence, using
(3.15) and accounting for γ = 1 given the calibration defined above, country’s
i expenditure on goods imported from country j can be expressed as: This
probability can be expressed as:
piKij =
AKj(wjdKij)
−θ∑I
s=1AKs(wsdKis)
−θ = P
θ
Ki
(
TKj
dKij
)θ
(3.21)
Similarly, country i expenditure on domestically produced goods is piKii =
P θKiT
θ
Ki. So, normalizing (3.21) by the importer’s home sales and taking logs,
we have:
ln
(
piKij
piKii
)
= θ ln(TKj)− θ ln(TKi)− θ ln(dKji) (3.22)
Bilateral trade costs include distance between countries, use of common
language, trade agreements, and sharing a border. The empirical specification
of (3.22) then becomes:
ln
(
piKij
piKii
)
= βK1 ln(distanceji) + βK2Languageji + βK3Trade AgreementKji+
βK4Borderji + SKj + SKi + Kji
(3.23)
where SKj is the exporter fixed effect, SKi is the importer fixed effect, and
Kji is the random component.
Data about trade costs is taken from the CEPII data set. Following Eaton-
Kortum (2002) the share of imports from country j to country i is computed
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as:
pˆiKij =
ImportsKji
Sectoral OutputKi − ExportsKi + ImportsKi
(3.24)
Sectoral output is computed from World Bank (WDI) sectoral shares grossed
up by 0.9−1 and by 0.5−1 in manufacturing (Tombe, 2012) Data on trade flows
are taken from WIT. Agricultural flows correspond to ISIC (Revision 3) 01,
02, and 05 digit codes. Manufacturing flows are the ones classified with an
ISIC digit code from 10 to 40.
3.4 Estimation of the model and the price level
In this section I estimate the econometric specification (3.23) by OLS. Table
3.5 reports the results of the regressions. Distance has a significant negative
effect on the trade shares between pairs of countries, while sharing a border,
having a common language, and having a regional trade agreement have a
positive effect.
The parameters of the model are then linked to the regression estimates by
TˆKi = e
SˆKi/θ and dˆKji = e
−(βˆK1Dist+βˆK2Lang+βˆK3Trade Agr.+βˆK4Border)/θ, which are
then used to compute the price level (3.16). Table 3.2 reports some ranking of
secotral competitiveness. It shows that developed and emerging countries have
a higher absolute advantage in both sectors respect to low-income countries,
which in turn tend to have a higher relative advantage in the agricultural
sector.
Given the estimates obtained above the price level implied by the model is
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then:
Pi =

∑
K∈(A,M,S)
ψκK
 I∑
s=1
(
TˆKs
dˆKis
)θK− 1θK

1
1−κ
(3.25)
I then run a non-parametric LOWESS estimation of the price-income rela-
tionship using the estimate of (3.25) and I compare the result with that implied
by the Balassa-Samuelson + framework. In figure fig3.1 we can see that the
multi-sector Eaton-Kortum model of trade can generate a non-monotonic pat-
tern of the price-income relationship. Table 3.3 shows also an improvement of
the quantitative fit. The standard deviation is 30% lower than in the previous
model and the turning point is at a lower level of income.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter shows that a multi-sector Eaton-Kortum model of trade can
generate a non-monotonic pattern of the price-income relationship. This is
a relevant result because it confirms that the non-monotonicity documented
in the first chapter is not a spurious result, but a hitherto undocumented
economic fact.
A further improvement of this analysis would be to account for the dif-
ferent contribution that trade costs, endogenous tradability, and technology
have in generating the non-monotonic pattern that is observed. This exten-
sion can be carried through the standard counter-factual experiments that the
Eaton-Kortum framework allows and it would improve our understanding of
the determinants of the price-income relationship.
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3. Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Trade Regression
Dependent var: Normalized Import Share Agriculture Manufacturing
Ln-Distance -1.45*** -1.51***
(-26.1) (-30.7)
Shared border 1.08*** 0.93***
(7.6) (6.0)
Common Language 1.05*** 1.28***
(10.2) (16.0)
Trade Agreement 0.48*** 0.59***
(5.37) (6.9)
Exporter fixed effects Yes Yes
Importer fixed effects Yes Yes
No. of observations 7336 7863
R-squared 0.6 0.73
*** Significant at the 1% level; robust t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 3.2: Countries’ competitiveness
Top 10 Agriculture Top 10 Manufacturing Top 10 Relative Agriculture
United States China Ecuador
China United States Mauritania
Argentina Japan Namibia
Brazil Germany Uruguay
Thailand Korea, Republic of New Zealand
New Zealand France Chile
Canada Italy Senegal
Netherlands United Kingdom Colombia
France Malaysia Gambia
Germany Brazil Argentina
Bottom 10 Agriculture Bottom 10 Manufacturing Top 10 Relative Manufacturing
Rwanda Rwanda Japan
Niger Gambia Korea, Rep.
Albania Lesotho Kuwait
Nepal Central African Republic Hong Kong
Gabon Sierra Leone Sweden
Central African Republic Niger Finland
Kuwait Mauritania Saudi Arabia
Mali Armenia Malaysia
Botswana Burkina Faso Slovenia
Armenia Botswana Nigeria
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Figure 3.1: Price-income relationship in the model and in the data: Non-Parametric Estimation
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Table 3.3: Data and models
Trade model BS+ Model Data
Countries on negative path 26% 26% 22%
Price, Std. Deviation 0.74 1.02 0.41
Turning point 2,024 PPP$ 3,070 PPP$ 1,464 PPP$
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Chapter 4
Foreign Capital Flows and
Income Inequality in Emerging
Markets: the interaction
between the real exchange rate
and the labor market
4.1 Introduction
One of the most important features of the current globalization process is the
continuous strengthening of financial integration and the rise of capital flows.
In the last twenty years the daily average Forex turnover has increased by
seven fold in absolute terms and by almost three fold as percentage of World
GDP1; and the de facto financial openness indicator of the IMF has more than
doubled in all developing regions 2
At the same time income inequality within countries has increased sharply.
Galbraith (2007) shows that wage inequality in developing countries, after a
stable trend between 1963 and 1980, has risen by almost 50% between 1980 and
1Elaboration on data from BIS and WDI
2See World Economic Outlook, 2007. The IMF indicator is the ratio of assets and capital
liabilities over GDP.
73
2000. As Wade (2008) argues, this trend matters for the development process
of poorer countries. There is suggestive evidence that higher income inequality
within countries is associated with lower elasticity between growth and poverty
reduction, and weaker public goods provision. Moreover, as Birdsall (2004)
points out, income inequality undermines collective decision making and social
institution critical to a sound and cohesive society.
The combination of large and fast rising capital flows, relative to GDP, and
high and rising income inequality in most developing countries raises the ques-
tion of the connection between the two trends. It is not hard to see some mech-
anisms linking them, but the subject has been almost completely neglected in
the literature. One of the few exceptions is the study by Taylor (2000), who
discusses the effects of the Washington Consensus on the functional distribu-
tion of income, stressing the role of capital account liberalization. However, it
does not consider wage inequality and it discards the role of the labor market,
which is the primary source of within-countries inequality as Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2007) show.
The literature on globalization and inequality is surprisingly silent about
the distributional effects of capital flows. The World Economic Outlook of the
IMF (2007) acknowledges in passing that capital flows like equities, portfolio
debt, cross-border banking lending can affect income inequality, but it makes
no analysis of the connection; and the wider literature contains virtually no
specific studies on this issue. The excellent survey of Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2007) titled “Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries”
represents well the status of the literature. The section “Capital Flows” is just
one paragraph long and it is the shortest point in the section “The relationship
between globalization and inequality”. It quotes only two papers, yet neither
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of those papers has a primary focus on the distributional effects of capital
flows.3
The aim of our work is to analyze the effects that foreign capital flows have
on income inequality in emerging countries. If we want to sustain the upside
of capital flows, or globalization in general, it is important to understand and
manage its downsides. Rising income inequality can be one of the negative
effects of capital flows and I want to investigate this unexplored connection.
In the paper capital flows is the exogenous variable and the mechanism that
links capital flows to income inequality is centered in the labor market. This
is consistent with Calvo et alt. (1993) where financial shocks in the developed
world are the cause of capital flows in developing countries; and with Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007) who find that in developing countries the labor market
governs the overall distribution of income through unemployment and wage
differential between skilled and unskilled workers.
We try to disentangle the effects of foreign capital flows on income inequal-
ity through a theoretical model which has the merit to connect in a general
equilibrium framework the macroeconomic models on the dynamics of the bal-
ance of payments with the search and matching models of the labor market.
This allows us to address a fresh and to our knowledge original issue: the ef-
fects of real exchange rate adjustment on the labor market as the link between
foreign capital flows and income inequality. Section 4.2 presents the empirical
motivation behind this paper; section 4.3 discusses the theoretical link between
3Cregg and Epelbaum (1996) analyze the increasing wage dispersion in Mexico due to
an import-catalyzed technological change; they affirm that financial integration might have
played a role by favouring the imports of cheaper capital goods. Behrman et alt. (2000) find
that capital account liberalization had a strong negative impact on the relative log-wage of
skilled and unskilled workers. However, the authors are more attentive to stress that its
not trade liberalization that increased inequality rather than to analyze the mechanism that
links capital account openness and inequality
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capital flows and income inequality; section 4.4 introduces the analytical model
and section 4.5 analyzes the general equilibrium effects of capital flows; finally
section 4.6 concludes the paper discussing further developments of this work.
4.2 Empirical motivation
Since the ’80s developing countries experienced a liberalization of trade
and capital flows. This process was accompanied by an important change of
income distribution within countries. This mainly refers to the experience of
semi-industrial emerging countries like Argentina, Hungary, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Russia and others.
Figure 4.1 provides a good example of the economic patterns the paper
wants to focus on. We can see that in Argentina, after the liberalization of
the current and capital account in 1991, inequality sharply increased between
1993 and 2002, the years of the currency board. During this period the country
was experiencing a net inflow of capitals around 4-5% of GDP and the Gini
coefficient increased from 0.47 to 0.55. This is a very remarkable change, given
the low range of variability that usually characterizes the Gini. An equally
remarkable change is the rapid decrease of income inequality, from 0.55 to
0.48, once the convertibility ended and the country became an exporter of
capitals. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the association between those
two dynamics.
In order to verify how general the association between capital flows and
income inequality is, I take a panel data set of 128 countries between 1980 and
2008 and run the following reduced form panel regression for the full sample
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and for emerging countries only. Table 4.1 reports the results of:
Giniit = β0 + β1 Capital flowsit−1 + β2 GDP per-capita growthit−1+
β3 Government expenditureit−1 + γi + δt + u it
(4.1)
The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (WDI data); the indepen-
dent variable is capital flows measured as the net financial account, excluding
reserve, in percentage of GDP (IMF data); the control variables are GDP
growth per-capita (WDI) and government consumption as percentage of GDP
(WDI). Moreover, a set of country and year dummies are added to control for
the time-invariant characteristics of a country and for country-invariant vari-
ables that might have affected inequality in all countries in a given year. The
independent and the control variables are taken with a one-year lag because
a change in capital flows or in government expenditure is likely to require
some time before showing any effect on income inequality. Whether GDP per-
capita growth should be included with one lag or not is more questionable as
economic growth can also have a contemporary effect on income inequality.
However, the results of Table 4.1 barely change if GDP per-capita growth at
time t substitutes or is added to its lagged value.
The results show that an increase in capital inflows is associated to a pos-
itive and significant rise in income inequality both in the full sample and in
emerging countries where the correlation is stronger in magnitude. The ef-
fect of GDP per-capita growth is negative as it could be expected, but it is
not statistically significant. Surprisingly, aggregate government consumption
is associated to higher income inequality in the full sample; using social expen-
diture rather than aggregate expenditure would provide a better assessment,
but unfortunately data availability on this is quite limited.
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I have run regression (4.1) disaggregating the financial flows into foreign
direct investments, financial derivatives, portfolio investmentss, and other in-
vestments; moreover, I have also considered reserve assets. The results in Table
4.2 show that, in the full sample, portfolio flows have a positive and significant
effect (at the 10% level) on income inequality; whereas an increase in reserve
assets is associated to a significant (at the 5% level) decrease income inequal-
ity. In emerging countries, the flow that is relevant is the one classified as
”other investments”; this includes trade credits, loans, currency and deposits,
and other assets and liabilities. I do not find any significant effect of foreign
direct investments on the Gini coefficient. This is not necessarily in contrast
with the literature that has found a positive effect of FDI on inequality. This
literature, which focuses mainly on the case of Latin America, focuses on the
stock of FDI rather than on the net flows.
According to our knowledge the association between net foreign capital
flows and income inequality in emerging countries have not yet been docu-
mented. The results shown in this section suggest that a novel contribution to
the literature can be made. The next parts of the paper try to identify from
a theoretical point of view the causal mechanism that links capital flows to
income inequality.
4.3 Theoretical explanation and key assump-
tions
This section rationalizes the link between capital flows and income inequal-
ity. Let’s suppose that there is an exogenous shock coming from foreign capitals
inflows. As in Calvo et alt. (1993) factors that can generate capital inflows are
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low international interest rates, development of the US balance of payments,
US economic performance etc. This is consistent with the original idea of Diaz-
Alejandro (1984) that in developing countries capital flows can be considered
truly exogenous, as financial shocks in the center affect the periphery.
The inflow of capital generates an income effect that increases demand of
both tradable and non-tradable goods. In order to satisfy the higher demand
for non-tradables a shift of production resources from the tradable to the non-
tradable sector is required. This can be achieved if the price of non-tradable
goods increases; this implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate. As the
real exchange rate appreciates and more domestic resources are targeted to the
production of non-tradable goods, the higher demand for tradables is satisfied
through imports. Therefore, the final effects of foreign capital inflows are:
real exchange rate appreciation, increase in the relative supply of non-tradable
goods, and current account deficit.
How do these effects influence the labor market, hence income inequal-
ity? How are unemployment and the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers affected?
Wages in both sectors are subject to a supply and a demand effect. As the
relative production of non-tradables increases, the demand effect makes wages
rise in the non-tradable sector and decline in the tradable sector. However,
as the number of workers in the non-tradable sector increases, the marginal
product of labor diminishes pinning down the wage rate; the reverse occurs
in the tradable sector. Thus, the supply effect on wages is negative in the
non-tradable sector and positive in the tradable one.
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In the case of the standard neo-classical model with full employment, supply
and demand effects tend to cancel out. However, in the case of a search and
matching model the supply effect tends to dominate as long as the ratio of
the job-finding and separtion rates decreases. Under this scenario, as capitals
flow in, the wage gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors increases
contributing to a higher level of income inequality.
Linking wages in the tradable and non-tradable sectors to skilled and un-
skilled wages is an important aspect of this analysis. The paper associates
wages in the tradable sector to skilled workers and wages in the non-tradable
sector to unskilled workers. This simplifying assumption is empirically moti-
vated by the fact that emerging economies have a very large share of informal
employment, which is unskilled, and that this is largely absorbed by the non-
tradable sector.4
The effect of capital inflows on the job finding and separation rates is
crucial for the results of the model. If the ratio of the finding/separation rate
decreases, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers goes up. The
paper presents a model of exogenous job destruction where an appreciation
of the real exchange rate, that follows from capital inflows, decreases the job
finding/separation rate in the tradable sector. As Pissarides (2000) points out,
a change in relative prices reflect a demand shock, here coming from capital
flows, that affects the separation and the finding rates. The assumption of a
reduction of the job finding/separation ratio in the tradable sector is grounded
4In countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico between 42% and 53% of the non-
agricultural employment is informal and this share increases to a range of 70% - 82% for
countries like Indonesia, India, and Philippines (ILO 2012). Fiess et al. (2009) show that the
non-tradable sector absorbs 81% of the informal employment in Argentina, 84% in Brasil,
83% in Colombia, and 87% in Mexico; whereas La Porta and Shleifer (2008) document that
0.1% is the share of exports from sales of the informal economy. This evidence leads Fiess
et al. (2009) to model the non-tradable sector as the informal one.
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in Gourinchas (1998). He shows, for the US case, that a decrease in the
relative price of tradables causes a contraction of the finding/separation ratio
in the tradable sector. This happens because a lower relative price of tradables
reduces the opportunity cost of non-market activities like reorganization and
search and matching.
The effect of foreign capital flows on unemployment, the other important
source of income inequality, is more ambiguous. The value function of unem-
ployment is subject to both a reduction, due to a lower job finding/separation
rate, and an increase due to higher wages in the tradable sector. As long as
the first effect dominates, unemployment increases with capital inflows.
This model seems to provide a good representation of the dynamics that
characterized developing countries during the Washington Consensus when
countries with capital inflows and real exchange rate appreciation suffered an
increase in income inequality (i.e. Argentina or Malaysia). The model is also
consistent with the decline in income inequality, accompanied with capital out-
flows and real exchange rate depreciation that some countries experienced in
the last years. For instance, if we look at the case of Argentina, during the ’90s
we observe capital inflows, real exchange rate appreciation, increasing relative
production of non-tradables, expanding wage gap between the tradable and
non-tradable sector, growing unemployment, and higher inequality; whereas
the opposite dynamics characterizes the ’00s when the country experienced
capital outflows. Although the Argentinean experience might not be represen-
tative of all the developing world, it provides a quasi-natural experiment for
observing the effects of capital flows on income inequality via real exchange
rate variation and labor markets dynamics because a relatively long period
of growth and capital inflows in the ’90s was followed by a period of growth
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and capital outflows in the ’00s. Nevertheless further empirical work and a
quantitative analysis are required to evaluate the validity of the model.
4.4 Model set-up
4.4.1 Production technology
We consider an economy with a tradable and a non-tradable sector. We assume
that labor is the only factor of production; this simplifies the tractability of
the model and it allows us to focus on the labor market; future development
of the model will include capital as a factor of production:
Y NTt =
(
LNTt
)β
, 0 < β < 1 (4.2)
and for the tradable sector it is:
Y Tt =
(
LTt
)α
, 0 < α < 1 (4.3)
The value of the parameters α and β is fundamental for our result. We
assume that there are decreasing returns to scale and that labor in the non-
tradable sector has, on average, lower productivity than in the tradable sector.
As discussed in the previous section, this is consistent with the high level of in-
formality that characterize the non-tradable sector. A drawback of the model
is to have a rigid sectoral division between skilled and unskilled workers. It
is not clear why a skilled worker employed in the tradable sector should be-
come unskilled if reemployed in the non-tradable sector. However, Gourinchas
(1998) and Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) show that after a relative price shock
most of the labor reallocation occurs within rather than between sectors. This
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empirical fact can mitigate and provide partial support for the assumption of
the model.
4.4.2 Preferences and utility maximization
We assume that there is a continuum of households with a unitary measure.
Each household consumes and supplies labor. According to the big family
assumption in each households there are three types of members: employed in
the non-tradable sector as well as unemployed and employed in the tradable
sector. Over time individuals can switch between occupations, but the relative
proportion of each type are fixed. Households maximize lifetime utility over
the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods. Utility is represented
by a standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function with Cobb-
Douglas preferences:
U =
∞∑
t=0
φt
1
1− 1/σ
{[(
CTt
)γ (
CNTt
)1−γ]1−1/σ − 1} (4.4)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the discount factor, σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and 0 < γ < 1 is the preference parameter for the tradable
goods. 5
The utility maximization problem is solved as in Rebelo and Vegh (1995).
We assume that the representative household directly operates the economy’s
technology and sell products in the goods market. We consider the tradable
good as the numeraire and we define Pt as the relative price of non-tradable
to tradable goods. Considering that consumers can borrow and lend in the
international capital markets at the exogenous interest rate r∗, the budget
5At the optimized value, for a constant return to scale Cobb Douglas function, γ is the
consumptions share of tradable goods.
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constraint of the economy is:
Y Tt + PtY
NT
t +Bt−1(1 + r) = C
T
t + PtC
NT
t +Bt (4.5)
where Bt is the private net foreign asset holdings. We simplify our model
with respect to Rebelo and Vegh (1995) by not considering government in our
economy. The no-Ponzi game condition for the representative agent is:
lim
t→∞
Bt
1 + r
= 0 (4.6)
I also assume that φ = (1 + r)−1. In this case, a permanent change in
output does not affect the current account; this implies that we can abstract
from the presence of trend in the current account. 6
The optimality condition of consumption derived from equation (4.2), (4.3),
(4.5), and (4.6) is the standard one for CRRA functions:
1− γ
γ
CTt
CNTt
= Pt (4.7)
where Pt represents also the RER which, as it is well renown, can be ex-
pressed as the relative price of non-tradable to tradable goods; an increase of
Pt implies an appreciation of the RER (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).
4.4.3 Domestic and external market clearing conditions
We assume that non-tradable goods are used only for consumption so that:
PtC
NT
t = PtY
NT
t (4.8)
6On this point see also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)
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In an open economy the equilibrium for the market in tradable goods is:
Ct = Y
T
t − TBt (4.9)
where TBt is the trade balance of our economy.
Private net foreign assets are then given by the identity:
Bt+1 ≡
(
Y Tt + PtY
NT
t
)− (CTt + PtCNTt )+ (1 + r)Bt =
TBt + (1 + r)Bt
(4.10)
According to the standard absorption approach to the balance of payments
the current account is defined as:
CAt ≡ Bt+1 −Bt = r∗Bt + TBt (4.11)
From equations (4.10) and (4.11) we can see that capital outflows imply a cur-
rent account surplus; vice versa a current account deficit reflects an excessive
absorption of the country, and it entails an inflow of capitals.
4.4.4 The labor market
Following Pissarides (2000) and Davidson and Matusz (2004), we now elab-
orate a search and matching model to describe the labor market. We assume
that the non-tradable sector offers jobs, which do not need many skills, are
easy to find, and pay low wages; whereas, the tradable sector offers jobs that
require higher skills, are harder to find, and pay relatively higher wages. The
turnover rate differs between the two sectors. It is lower in the tradable sector,
where the matching of firms and workers is harder because higher skills are
85
required; thus, once a match has been created, the jobs tend to last longer. In
the non-tradable sector, we assume that there is an instant matching between
firms and workers; jobs do not last long, but they are very easy to find; thus,
in this sector, there is never unemployment. This assumption simplifies the
tractability of the model and allows to abstract from the effect of a change in
the relative price on the job finding and separation rate in the non-tradable
sector. This is justified by the finding of Gourinchas (1998) who show that a
change in relative price does not cause a statistically significant change of the
job finding and separation rates in the non-tradable sector. In the context of
our model this can emerge because the presence of a large pool of unskilled
and informal workers makes the opportunity cost of non market activities like
reorganization, search and matching constantly very low in the non-tradable
sector.
It is important to stress that the supply side of the factor market is ana-
lyzed according to the search and matching literature, as in Pissarides (2000).
However, the demand side is derived through efficiency wages. As it becomes
clear below, this kind of framework makes it possible to examine in more detail
the connections between the goods and the factor market.
Demand side of the labor market
The demand side of the labor market is determined by the optimizing be-
havior of firms. In equilibrium, wages equal the value of the marginal product
of labor. Taking the tradable good as the numeraire, this implies from (4.2)
that:
wNTt = β
(
LNTt
)β−1
Pt (4.12)
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LNTt =
(
wNTt
βPt
) 1
β−1
(4.13)
The economic intuition of equation (4.12) is that wages in the non-tradable
sector decrease when LNT rises (β−1 is negative). This is not surprising since
the marginal product of labor has a decreasing return to scale; thus, optimizing
firms hire new workers only at a lower wage rate.
For the tradable sector, from (4.3) we obtain:
wTt = α
(
LTt
)α−1
(4.14)
LTt =
(
wTt
α
) 1
α−1
(4.15)
When α > β, we can observe that, as new workers are hired, wages in the
tradable sector will decrease at a lower rate than in the non-tradable.
Supply side of the labor market
The supply side of the labor market is modeled in a search and matching
framework. We think about employment and unemployment as if they were
human capital assets. These assets are valued by arbitrage conditions. There-
fore, the value of an employed worker must be equal to the present discounted
value of his expected flows of income. In the non-tradable sector, income flows
are wNT plus a minimum wage z. 7 Thus, in the non-tradable sector the works
value WNT is given by:
rWNTt = w
NT
t + z (4.16)
7We also assume that z is the same for both sectors and is granted also to unemployed
workers.
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where r is the interest rate.
In the tradable sector, the works value is determined by taking into account
that there is a positive probability of becoming unemployed, as jobs break up
at an exogenous rate b. 8 Therefore, the value of work in the tradable sector
is given by:
rW Tt = w
T
t + z + b(U
T
t −W Tt ) (4.17)
where (UTt −W Tt ) is a negative value.
The value of unemployment is determined by the minimum wage plus the
eventual capital gain (W Tt − UTt ) that is realized if the worker changes to the
employed status:
rUTt = z + e(W
T
t − UTt ) (4.18)
where e is the rate at which jobs are created and we call it the job-finding rate.
Summing up equations (4.17) and (4.18) and solving Wt and Ut we can
rewrite these expressions as:
rW Tt = z +
(r + e)wTt
r + b+ e
(4.19)
rUTt = z +
ewTt
r + b+ e
(4.20)
In equilibrium the supply side of factors’ market must satisfy two conditions:
1. In order for both goods to be produced, it must be that the value of a
job in the non-tradable sector is equal to the value of unemployment in
8As in Pissarides (2000) the shocks that break up jobs can be caused by changes in the
relative price due to structural shifts in demand.
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the tradable sector:
WNTt = U
T
t (4.21)
In fact, if WNTt < U
T
t , a worker would prefer to be unemployed in the
tradable sector, rather than work in the non-tradable sector; in this case,
non-tradable goods would not be produced. Whereas, if WNTt > U
T
t , a
worker would choose to take a low paid job in the non-tradable sector.
This would imply that once jobs break up in the tradable sector new jobs
cannot be created because there are no unemployed workers; this cannot
be equilibrium.
Combining equations (4.16) and (4.20), condition (4.21) is satisfied when:
wNTt =
ewTt
r + b+ e
(4.22)
2. We also need an equilibrium condition in the tradable sector for the flows
of workers between unemployment and employment, so that:
bLTe = eL
T
u (4.23)
where LTe and L
T
u are respectively the number of workers employed and
unemployed in the tradable sector. Taking into account the fact that the
total number of workers in the economy is L = LNT + LTe + L
T
u , we can
rewrite equation (4.23) as:
LTe =
e
b+ e
(
L− LNT ) (4.24)
according to this condition, the number of employed workers in the trad-
able sector decreases when labor in the non-tradable sector rises, break-
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up rate goes up, and the finding rate decreases.
In the next section we analyze how foreign capital flows affect the equilib-
rium of the economy, in particular that in the labor market.
4.5 Capital flows and model’s equilibrium
4.5.1 The goods market
The demand side of the goods market is represented by (4.7) 1−γ
γ
CTt
CNTt
= Pt.
We can see that there is a negative relation between the RER and the relative
demand of non-tradable goods.
Since labor is the only factor of production, the supply side of the market
is derived through the equilibrium conditions of the labor market. Therefore,
substituting equation (4.22) in (4.13) 9 and then in (4.2) we can write the
optimal supply of the non-tradable goods as:
Y ∗ NTt =
[
(r + b+ e)βPt
ewTt
] β
1−β
(4.25)
It is important to notice that when wages in the tradable sector increase,
the production of the non-tradable goods decreases. The intuition is that as
wT goes up, workers shift from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, causing
a reduction of non-tradable goods output.
Similarly, the optimal supply of tradable goods can be obtained by substi-
9We remind the reader that (4.22) is the equilibrium of the supply side of the labour
market and(4.13) is the equilibrium condition of its demand side.
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tuting equilibrium condition (4.24) in (4.2) and then (4.3), so that:
Y ∗ Tt =
{
e
b+ e
[
L− (Y ∗ NTt )1/β]}α (4.26)
The relative supply curve of the goods market is thus represented by:
S∗ ≡ Y
∗ NT
t
Y ∗ Tt
= f
(
Pt;L; e; r; b;w
T
t ; β
)
(4.27)
we can see that when the RER appreciates, the production of non-tradable
goods increases, consequently by (4.26) that of the tradable goods decreases.
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the relative supply of non-
tradable goods and the RER.
Let’s now suppose that the economy experience an inflow of capitals. 10
This generates an expansion of credit, so that households want to consume a
greater amount of both tradable and non-tradable goods. This can be rep-
resented by an upward shift of the demand curve in Figure 4.2, where the
economy reaches a new equilibrium at point 2 characterized by a more appre-
ciated real exchange rate.
The intuition is that in order to satisfy the demand for non-tradable goods
it is necessary to shift resources from the tradable to the non-tradable sector.
This is possible only if the price of non-tradables increase which implies an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. As the real exchange rate appreciates
and more domestic resources are targeted to the production of non-tradable
goods, the higher demand for tradable goods is satisfied through imports.
10 See Calvo et al. (1993) for a detailed description of the factors that generate capital
inflows i.e. during the nineties. They identify low international interest rate, the balance of
payments development of the US, and US economic performance. Thus, capital flows can be
considered truly exogenous as in the idea of Diaz-Alejandro (1984) where financial shocks
in the center affect the periphery.
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Therefore, foreign capital inflows lead to a real exchange rate appreciation, a
current account deficit, and to an increase of the relative supply of non-tradable
goods.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that, as stressed by Pissarides
(2000), structural shifts in demand and changes in the relative price affect
the break-up and the job-finding rate in the labor market. Because of the
contraction in the tradable sector, we have a raise of the braking-up and a
decrease of the job-finding rates. This would lead to an increase of the relative
supply of non-tradable goods. In fact we can see that:
∂Y NT
∂b
=
β
1− β
(
Y NT
) 2β−1
1−β β
e
P
wT
> 0 (4.28)
∂Y T
∂b
= α
(
Y T
)α−1{− e
(b+ e)2
[
L− (Y NT )1/β]+ e
b+ e
1
β
(
Y NT
) 1−β
β
∂Y NT
∂b
}
< 0
(4.29)
∂Y NT
∂b
− ∂Y
T
∂b
> 0 (4.30)
As more jobs break up in the tradable sector, more workers are available to be
employed in the non-tradable sector, whose relative production can therefore
increase. Similarly a higher job finding rate in the tradable sector decreases
the number of workers that can be employed in the non-tradable sector so that
the relative production of non-tradable goods decreases.
∂Y NT
∂e
=
β
1− β
(r + b)βPwT
(ew)2
(
Y NT
)2β
< 0 (4.31)
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∂Y T
∂e
= α
(
Y T
)α−1{ b
(b+ e)2
[
L− (Y NT )1/β]− e
b+ e
1
β
∂Y NT
∂e
}
> 0 (4.32)
∂Y NT
∂e
− ∂Y
T
∂e
< 0 (4.33)
Therefore, the decrease of the job-finding breakup ratio (e / b) leads to
a leftward shift of the supply curve so that the relative price of non-tradable
goods decreases. Whether this supply effect counterbalances the demand effect
depends on parameters and should be object of a quantitative analysis. In
figure 4.3 we represent the case where the final equilibrium at point 3 has a
higher real exchange rate than the initial case
4.5.2 The labor market - wage inequality
In this paragraph, we analyze how the new equilibrium in the good market
affects wage inequality between different sectors. Combining equations (4.14)
and (4.3), we can write the wage in the tradable sector as:
wT = α
(
Y ∗ T
)α−1
α (4.34)
Combining equations (4.12) and (4.2), we can write the wage in the non-
tradable sector as:
wNT = βP
(
Y ∗ NT
)β−1
β (4.35)
Combing (4.34) and (4.35) the relative wage of the non-tradable sector is:
wNT
wT
= P
β
α
(
Y ∗ T
) 1−α
α
(Y ∗ NT )
1−β
β
(4.36)
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Where:
Y ∗ NT =
(
(r + b+ e)βP
ewT
) β
1−β
(4.37)
Y ∗ T =
{
e
b+ e
[
L− (Y ∗NT )1/β]}α = { e
b+ e
[
L−
(
(r + b+ e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
]}α
(4.38)
Taking logs equation (4.36) becomes:
lnwNT − lnwT = ln β− lnα+lnP +
(
1− α
α
lnY ∗T − 1− β
β
lnY ∗NT
)
(4.39)
substituting for Y ∗NT we get:
lnwNT − lnwT = ln β − lnα + lnP + β
1− β
β
1− β [ln(r + b+ e)+
ln β + lnP − ln e− lnwT + 1− α
α
lnY ∗T
(4.40)
Differentiating respect to the relative price
∂(lnwNT − lnwT )
∂ lnP
=
∂
(
ln e− lnα− ln(r + b+ e) + lnwT + 1−α
α
lnY ∗T
)
∂ lnP
=
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
+
1− α
α
∂ lnY ∗T
∂ lnP
(4.41)
Lets now focus on the last term of this expression reminding that ∂ lnY
∗T
∂ lnP
=
∂Y ∗T
∂P
P
Y ∗T , so that by (4.38) we get that
∂Y ∗T
∂P
P
Y ∗T
= α
{
e
b+ e
[
L−
(
(r + b+ e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
]}α−1
−
e
b+ e
(
(r + b+ e)βP
ewT
) β
1−β (r + b+ e)βewT − (r + b+ e)βPe∂wT
∂P
(ewT )2
P
Y T
(4.42)
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Rearranging we can get:
∂ lnY ∗T
∂ lnP
= α
(
(r+b+e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
L−
(
(r+b+e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
(
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
− 1
)
< 0 (4.43)
From 4.26 and 4.25 we know that ∂Y
T
∂P
< 0, as the relative price of non-
tradables increase the supply of tradable decreases. Using (4.34) this implies
that ∂ lnw
T
∂ lnP
< 1; hence 4.43 is negative. Going back to (4.41) and substituting
for (4.43) we get:
∂(lnwNT − lnwT )
∂ lnP
=
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
+ (1− α)
(
(r+b+e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
L−
(
(r+b+e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
(
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
− 1
)
=
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
+ (1− α) e
b+ e
(Y ∗NT )1/β
(Y ∗T )1/α
(
∂ lnwT
∂ lnP
− 1
)
(4.44)
we know that ∂ lnw
T
∂ lnP
< 1. So the key question is if
∣∣∣(1− α) eb+e (Y ∗NT )1/β(Y ∗T )1/α ∣∣∣ R 1
This is a numerical issue that depends on parameters and the relative
supply of non-tradable goods. As long as (Y
∗NT )1/β
(Y ∗T )1/α  1, which given β < α
requires that Y ∗NT > Y ∗T , this relationship is greater than one. Therefore, it
is likely that the real exchange rate appreciation triggered by capital inflows
increases the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers, contributing to
the overall rise of income inequality.
As we have seen in the previous section, one of the consequences following
capital flows is the rise of the breakup rate and the reduction of the job-finding
rate. This has a positive effect on the wage gap between the tradable and non-
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tradable sector. In fact: 11
∂wT
∂b
=
α(1− α)(1− β)e(wT )2Φα−2
{
e
e+b
[
L− Γ 11−β
]
+ β
1−β
P
wT
Γ
β
1−β
}
(1− β)(b+ e)(ewT )2 + αβ(1− α)(r + b+ e)ePΓ β1−βΦα−2
> 0
(4.45)
the intuition is that when more jobs breakup in the tradable sector, the wage
increases because of the diminishing returns to labor. Whereas in the non-
tradable sector we can see that:
∂wNT
∂b
=
e
r + b+ e
∂wT
∂b
− ew
T
(r + b+ e)2
<
∂wT
∂b
(4.46)
So that the overall effect on the wage gap is positive:
∂wT
∂b
− ∂w
NT
∂b
=
(
1− e
r + b+ e
)
∂wT
∂b
+
ewT
(r + b+ e)2
> 0 (4.47)
Similarly, the effect of a change in the job-finding rate is such that:
∂wT
∂e
=
α(α− 1)(1− β)e(wT )2Φα−2
{
b
e+b
[
L− Γ 11−β
]
+ β
1−β
P
wT
Γ
β
1−β
(
r+b+e
e
− 1)}
(1− β)(b+ e)(ewT )2 + αβ(1− α)(r + b+ e)ePΓ β1−βΦα−2
< 0
(4.48)
the intuition is that an increase in the job-finding rate increases the number
of workers employed in the tradable sector, because of diminishing marginal
returns this implies a reduction of wages. Whereas, the overall effect on the
wage in the non-tradable sector is going to be smaller, in fact:
∂wNT
∂e
=
r + b
r + b+ e
wT +
e
r + b+ e
∂wT
∂e
>
∂wT
∂e
(4.49)
So that combining (4.48) and (4.49) the overall effect of a change in the job-
11In order to save notation we define Φ = eb+e
[
L−
(
(r+b+e)βP
ewT
) 1
1−β
]
and Γ = (r+b+e)βP
ewT
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finding rate on the wage gap is negative:
∂wT
∂e
− ∂w
NT
∂e
=
(
1− e
r + b+ e
)
∂wT
∂e
− r + b
r + b+ e
wT < 0 (4.50)
In this section we have analyzed the effects that foreign capital inflows have
on the wage gap between the tradable and non-tradable sector through a real
exchange rate appreciation and a decrease of the e
b
ratio. We have seen that a
decrease of the e
b
ratio leads to a higher wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers; while the effect of the real exchange rate appreciation depends on
parameters, but it is more likely to increase the gap as long as the non-tradable
sector is larger than the tradable one. Therefore, capital inflows lead to higher
income inequality because of a wider wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers.
4.5.3 The labor market - unemployment
In this section we analyze the effects of foreign capital inflows on unem-
ployment which is one of the key determinants of inequality in developing
countries. The labor force is divided into employed in the non-tradable sector,
employed in the tradable sector, and unemployed in the tradable sector:
L = LNT + LTe + L
T
u (4.51)
Therefore, we firstly need to find the equilibrium allocation of the labor force
between the non-tradable and the tradable sector; then, we have to define the
repartition between employed and unemployed workers within the tradable
sector.
In figure 4.4 (panel A), we consider the value equations of employment in
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the tradable sector and of unemployment in the tradable sector. On the left
axis, we measure rWNT − z = wNT , while, on the right axis, rUT − z =
e
r+b+e
wT . The length of the horizontal axis is equal to the total number of
workers. The intersection between the two curves represents the equilibrium
allocation of labor between the tradable and non-tradable sectors, such that
the equilibrium condition WNT = UT is satisfied. 12
Figure 4.4A allows to determine the division of workers between the non-
tradable and tradable sector, but we cannot distinguish between employed and
unemployed workers in the tradable sector. Combining equation (4.51) with
the equilibrium condition (4.23) the total number of unemployed workers is
going to be given by:
LTu =
b
b+ e
(
L− LNT ) (4.52)
We can see that unemployment is influenced by the number of workers allo-
cated in the non-tradable sector and by the breaking and job-finding rates of
the search and matching model. Thus, in diagram B of figure 4.4 the downward
sloping curve shows all the combinations of LTe and L
T
u that sum to L− LNT ,
as determined in 4.4A. Whereas, the upward sloping curve shows all the com-
binations of LTe and L
T
u that satisfy the equilibrium condition bL
T
e = eL
T
u .
We can now examine the impact of capital flows on unemployment by
analyzing the effects of both real exchange rate appreciation and raise of the
finding/breakup rate ratio. When the real exchange rate appreciate the job-
value curve of the non-tradable sector shifts up as from (4.39) we know that:
∂
(
WNT − z)
∂P
=
∂wNT
∂P
> 0 (4.53)
12Since the marginal product of labor is decreasing in both sectors, the two curves are
downward sloping in labor. However, since in the tradable sector the productivity of labor
is higher than in the non-tradable sector the wT curve is flatter than the wNT curve
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The unemployment-value curve moves up as well since from (4.36):
∂
(
UT − z)
∂P
=
∂
(
e
r+b+e
wT
)
∂P
> 0 (4.54)
However, the elasticity of WNT respect to the real exchange rate is higher than
the elasticity of UT , in fact combining (4.31) and (4.32) we can see that:
∂wNT
∂P
P
wNT
=
∂wT
∂P
P >
∂wT
∂P
P
wT
e
e+ r + b
(4.55)
where the term at the right hand side of the inequality is the elasticity of (UT z)
respect to P .
This implies that the overall effect of real exchange rate appreciation is to
shrink the number of workers in the tradable sector to point 2 in panel A of
figure 4.4. As a consequence, in figure 4.5 the LT curve shifts in and we reach
a temporary new equilibrium at point 2 characterized by lower unemployment.
Nevertheless, we need to take into account also the contraction of the (e/b)
ratio. As (e/b) decreases the equilibrium curve LTe =
e
b
LTu rotates downwards
so that the economy reaches an equilibrium with a higher unemployment level.
However, in order to assess the final effect of foreign capital flows on unem-
ployment we should also consider how the new finding/breakup rate ratio af-
fects the job-value equation in the non-tradable sector and the unemployment-
value equation in the tradable sector. We can see that:
∂(UT − z)
∂e
=
∂
(
e
r+b+e
wT
)
∂e
=
r + b
(r + b+ e)2
wT +
e
r + b+ e
∂wT
∂e
R 0 (4.56)
∂(UT − z)
∂b
=
∂
(
e
r+b+e
wT
)
∂b
=
e
(r + b+ e)2
wT +
e
r + b+ e
∂wT
∂b
R 0 (4.57)
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These derivatives are equal to the sum of a positive and a negative term.
Thus, the effects of a change in the e and b on the value of unemployment is
indeterminate and it depends on the numerical value of the functions. The
reason is that two opposite effects are taking place. From one side, because
of the reduction (increase) in the job finding rate (break-up rate), it becomes
harder to find a job and it is easier to lose it so that the value of unemployment
diminishes. From the other side, as there are less workers employed in the
tradable sector (Y T decreased) the wage in this sector increases raising the
value of unemployment. Looking at equations (4.46) and (4.49) we can see
that the same indeterminacy characterizes the value function of employment
in the non-tradable sector.
Therefore, the contraction of the (e/b) ratio can lead either to a rise or to
a reduction of the workers employed in the non-tradable sector. In the latter
case the overall effect of foreign capital inflows would be an increase of the
unemployment equilibrium. In the former case the final result would depend
on whether the effect of a change in (e/b) on LTe =
e
b
LTu is stronger than the
effect on the value of unemployment in the tradable sector and of employment
in the non-tradable sector.
4.6 Conclusions and further developments
This paper fills a gap in the literature on globalization and income inequal-
ity. It shows that there is a significant positive association between net capital
flows and the Gini coefficient, in particular in emerging countries. The paper
then disentangles the theoretical mechanisms of this link through an analytical
model that connects in a general equilibrium framework the macroeconomic
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models on the dynamics of the balance of payments with the search and match-
ing models of the labor market.
In the model capital inflows lead to an increase in the relative production
and relative price of non-tradable goods. This generates an adjustment process
in the labor market, where employment in the tradable sector decreases. Part
of the workers previously employed in this sector are absorbed by the non-
tradable sector, but part of them remain unemployed. Because of the lower
productivity in the non-tradable sector respect to the tradable one, the relative
wage of the tradable sector increases during this adjustment process. The
increase in unemployment and in the relative wage of skilled workers lead to
an overall increase of income inequality.
The paper lays the ground for further theoretical and empirical research
on this subject. From a theoretical and point of view the next steps would
be to endogenize the break-up and job-finding rates to changes in the relative
price. Moreover the welfare implications of this model need to be assessed.
Finally, a more quantitative test of the model and a numerical analysis would
contribute to a better understanding of the link between capital flows and
income inequality.
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4. Figures and Tables
Table 4.1: Panel regression of income inequality on capital flows 1980-2008
Dependent var: Gini coefficient Full sample Emerging countries
Financial Account 0.07** 0.15**
Lag 1 (% GDP) (2.59) (2.47)
GDP per-capita growth -0.06 -0.05
Lag 1 (% GDP) (-1.1) (-0.76)
Government Consumption 0.17** 0.07
Lag 1 (% GDP) (2.16) (0.6)
Country, fe Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes
No. of countries 128 24
No. of observations 683 246
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; robust t-statistics
in parenthesis. Emerging countries (IMF definition):Argentina, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Chile, China, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Romania, Russian Fed-
eration, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.
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Table 4.2: Panel regression of income inequality on different categories of cap-
ital flows 1980-2008
Dependent var: Gini coefficient Full sample Emerging countries
Portfolio 0.07* 0.06
(1.75) (0.5)
Derivatives -0.8 0.07
(-0.96) (0.03)
FDI 0.07 -0.04
(1.14) (0.31)
Other Investments 0.04 0.20***
(1.32) (2.97)
Reserve Assets -0.11** -0.06
(-2.23) (-0.47)
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; robust t-statistics
in parenthesis. Emerging countries (IMF definition):Argentina, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Chile, China, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,Poland, Romania, Russian Fed-
eration, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.
Figure 4.1: Foreign capital flows and income inequality - Argentina
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Figure 4.2: Demand effect of foreign capital flows
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Figure 4.3: Supply effect of foreign capital flows
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium in the labor market
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Figure 4.5: RER appreciation and labor allocation
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Figure 4.6: Real exchange rate appreciation and unemployment equilibrium
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Figure 4.7: (e/b) contraction and unemployment equilibrium
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